It is not fair picking qustions for students classroom test/assessment in any way. A teacher should be creative in the particular enviroment.

Test Questions for Intro. to Philosophy (Phil 251):
Philosophy in General, Socrates, and Plato

Answers at end.

True/False (True=A, False=B)

1.  To say that philosophy encourages the adoption of a questioning attitude means that philosophic thinking encourages people to deny the existence of God or traditional moral beliefs.

2. In philosophy the purpose of rational self-examination is to develop arguments that correct or support beliefs in ways that could be persuasive even to people with different backgrounds.

3. Though philosophy is defined as the pursuit of wisdom, it does not investigate what it means to ask questions in the first place.

4. As the pursuit of wisdom, philosophy raises questions about almost everything except what it means to question in the first place.

5. Because philosophy requires that we question our beliefs, it cannot provide reasons why one set of beliefs should be preferred over another.

6. One of the primary aims of philosophy is to see how our beliefs compare with those of others who can and do raise objections against those beliefs.

7. Philosophy attempts to answer questions such as “Why do we exist?” by examining what it means to ask such questions and to evaluate whether proposed answers to such questions are justified.

8. Philosophical questions are generally more concerned with identifying how beliefs differ among persons or cultures than with how those different beliefs can be justified.

9. Myth provides the vocabulary and grammar in terms of which both philosophical questions and their answers are intelligible.

10.  By giving us a sense of purpose and moral value, myth indicates our place in nature and explains in general why things are the way they are.

11.  The point of the Socratic method is to determine the truth of a belief by means of dialectical exchange (questions and answers, hypothesis and counter-example).

12. Socrates’s comment that “the unexamined life is not worth living” is an example of his ironic technique of saying something that means just the opposite.

13. In the Socratic method of enquiry, one asks questions aimed at discovering the nature, essence, or fundamental principles of the topic under consideration.

14. Socratic ignorance is the same as complete skepticism because Socrates admits he knows nothing, not even whether his method of enquiry is appropriate.

15. Like the social sciences (e.g., psychology or sociology), philosophy discovers truths by identifying what people in fact believe instead of judging whether those beliefs are justified.

16. To say that philosophy is a “second order” discipline means that it investigates the presuppositions, criteria, and methods assumed by other disciplines.

17. To say that philosophy is more concerned with “second-order” or meta-level topics means that it is concerned more with facts and beliefs than with their presuppositions.
 

Multiple Choice

18. “Is there anything you would be willing to die for?” is a philosophical question insofar as:
  (a) it does not have any right or wrong answer because it is a meaningless question.
  (b) it is a meaningless question because everyone could have a different answer to it.
  (c) it forces us to articulate and justify our beliefs about what we know and ought to do.
  (d) it is more concerned with one’s religious beliefs than with factual claims about the world.

19. One of the aims of philosophy is to think critically about whether there are good reasons for adopting our beliefs.  Reasons are considered “good reasons” if they are consistent with everyday experience and:
  (a) are part of a set of religious, moral, or political beliefs that an individual feels deeply about.
  (b) are considered good by at least one culture, sub-culture, or individual.
  (c) cannot be interpreted in different ways by different people or cultures.
  (d) take into account objections, are acceptable to impartial third parties, and avoid undesirable consequences.

20. If the world that we individually perceive is limited to an internal perspective, then there is no way that we could determine whether our own perspective is useful, true, or valuable because:
  (a) we know whether our internal perspective is correct only by comparing it with an objective, external perspective (the “real” world).
  (b) whatever we appeal to in order to prove that our perspective is right itself would be part of the standard we use in evaluating that perspective.
  (c) scientific research that reveals facts about the world would cause us to challenge our perceptions in a dreamworld of our own making.
  (d) without limiting our perspective to an internal dreamworld, we cannot achieve any objective, external knowledge of the real world.

21. Philosophy is concerned primarily with identifying beliefs about human existence and evaluating arguments that support those beliefs.  These activities can be summarized in two questions that drive philosophical investigations:
  (a) why should we bother? and what are the consequences of our believing one thing over another?
  (b) what do you mean? and how do you know?
  (c) who really believes X? and how can we explain differences in people’s beliefs?
  (d) how do philosophers argue? and are their differences important?

22. One of the tasks of philosophy is to test conceptual frameworks for depth and consistency.  It does this through (1) expressing our ideas in clear, concise language and (2) supporting those ideas with reasons and with overcoming objections to them.  Philosophy thus emphasizes the need to:
  (a) pose questions that can be resolved not by reasoning but only by faith or personal belief.
  (b) show why the beliefs adopted by most people in a culture are preferable since more people understand those beliefs and see no reason to raise objections to them.
  (c) articulate what we mean by our beliefs and to justify our beliefs by arguments.
  (d) develop a set of ideas about the nature of society (i.e., an ideology) that can be used to support a religious conceptual framework.

23. The philosophic insistence on providing a logos for the world and our experience of it might itself rely ultimately on adopting a certain mythos, insofar as:
  (a) philosophy assumes that it is possible and meaningful to reason about the world and experience.
  (b) the myths of philosophy are really lies that are told to make so-called philosophic enquiries sound more respectable.
  (c) philosophy is based on logic, whereas myths are not based on logic.
  (d) mythos refers to the philosophic understanding of the world, whereas logos refers to the philosophic understanding of our experience of the world.

24. “There is no rationale for myth because it is through myth that reason itself is defined.”  This means that:
  (a) mythos is ultimately based on logos, just as myth is ultimately based on reasoning or thinking.
  (b) myth does not “explain” how things are related as much as it simply reveals them as related.
  (c) metaphysicians are justified in reasoning as they do because there is only one true answer about being.
  (d) myth and reason are the same: “myth” defines “reason,” and “reason” defines “myth.”

25. Whereas the social sciences (e.g., psychology, sociology, economics) ask questions about how people think and act, philosophy is the study of:
 (a) how people with different beliefs or backgrounds disagree with one another.
 (b) what beliefs mean and whether people with different beliefs are justified in having them.
 (c) the reasons why philosophic questions never have better or worse answers.
 (d) questions that can be answered better by appealing to scientific experiments.

26. To say that “philosophy” (like “love” or “art”) is not a closed concept means that we cannot state the necessary and sufficient conditions by which it is defined.  Rather, philosophic issues are identifiable as having “family resemblances” with one another.  In other words:
  (a) there is no one distinguishing feature that identifies an issue as philosophic, only an overlapping of issues roughly associated with one another.
  (b) the way we come to think about philosophy, love, or art really depends on how we were raised by our families to identify things as resembling one another.
  (c) the necessary and sufficient condition for something to be considered philosophic is that it answers either of these questions: What does it mean? and How do you know?
  (d) philosophy is not a closed discipline insofar as it is willing to accept any answer suggested by the “human family” as being true.

27. According to Socrates, just as there is a difference between what an ironic statement says and its true meaning, so also appearances differ from reality.  Even though societies or individuals appear to differ about what is required for the good life, that in no way contradicts the fact that:
 (a) what is right or wrong, true or false varies from one culture to another.
 (b) appearances are the only real way we have for knowing reality.
 (c) the distinction of appearance and reality is the basis for the dialectical discovery of truth.
 (d) there are objective principles for thought and action that are required for the good life.

28. According to Socrates, an unexamined life is not worth living; and it certainly could not be a virtuous life.  Why not?
  (a) Because if someone did not know how to act virtuously, he or she would still be considered virtuous by others who also did not know the principles for good living.
  (b) Because since Socrates was a philosopher, he of course thought that people who examined their lives philosophically were more virtuous than those who did not.
  (c) Because without knowing the rationale for why one should act in a particular way, one does not know whether actions are justified and ought to be repeated.
  (d) Because a virtuous life would be one in which someone does what the rest of the society says is right, and that means examining views other than one’s own.

29. In spite of the fact that Socrates claims to be ignorant of the essence or nature of certain things like justice, he is wise insofar as he recognizes that without such knowledge actions are rationally unjustified.  That is, his wisdom consists in his recognition not only that he is ignorant of such essences but also that:
  (a) justice, like knowledge, requires that we admit that we know nothing and never will.
  (b) he knows what he is supposed to be looking for–knowledge of the essences of things.
  (c) knowledge of the essences of things is impossible, because that would require that we know what we are looking for before we know what it is we are looking for.
  (d) his method of asking questions about essences is itself unjustified because he does not know why he engages in such a practice.

30. According to Socrates, the value or quality of one’s life depends on understanding the principles of, or basic rationale for human existence.  Without such knowledge (he suggests) life lacks virtue, because:
  (a) acting virtuously means acting in way that is informed about what one is doing and why.
  (b) someone who does not understand existence philosophically could never do anything right.
  (c) to have the power or ability to do anything at all requires that we know what we are doing.
  (d) not only is virtue knowledge but also the unexamined life is not worth living.

31. According to Socrates, it is important that we discover what makes a particular action (e.g., a merciful or just act) the kind of action that it is, because without such knowledge:
  (a) no one in society will ever do any action that really is merciful or just, only those actions that they think are merciful or just.
  (b) the primary purpose of human existence–which is to think and to know–is replaced by a focus on morality (acting and doing).
  (c) we can refer only to how people characterize actions without knowing why such actions should be characterized that way.
  (d) there would be no way to distinguish one kind of action (e.g., a merciful action) from another kind of action (e.g., a just action).

32.  For Socrates, the belief that “virtue is knowledge” is related to his claim that “the unexamined life is not worth living,” because he believes that:
  (a) the unexamined life is one in which we live day to day without asking questions about who we are and why we are here in the first place.
  (b) the Delphic oracle identified Socrates as the wisest person on earth because he claimed to know nothing.
  (c) by questioning traditional beliefs, we learn to recognize how some answers seem to be more satisfactory than others.
  (d) the only way to be a good or worthwhile person is to know how human beings should behave based on universal norms or values.

33. Socrates’ claim that “the unexamined life is not worth living” is often cited as a central theme in the activities of philosophy.  By it, Socrates is typically understood to mean that:
  (a) it is sometimes simply not worth all the effort of examining life and its problems in great detail; sometimes it is better simply to “go with the flow.”
  (b) while taking a reflective attitude toward life is interesting and even sometimes important, most of what makes life worth living is not worth examining.
  (c) simply doing whatever everyone else does without thinking about why we should do what we do can hardly be thought of as worthwhile, noble, or admirable.
  (d) it is a waste of time to sit around thinking about whether life is worth living; we should leave such reflection to talk-show hosts, political figures, and religious leaders.

34.  According to Socrates, the task of the wise and virtuous person is not simply to learn various examples of just or virtuous actions but to learn the essence of justice or virtue, because:
  (a) by knowing enough examples of justice or virtue, we will live a worthwhile life even if we do not know what makes them examples of justice or virtue.
  (b) knowledge of individual examples alone would not prepare someone for situations of justice or virtue to which the examples do not immediately apply.
  (c) what makes an action just or virtuous can be known only by asking people for their opinions and respecting each answer as equally valuable.
  (d) justice and virtue are universal goals of all human beings, even if people do not always agree on how to achieve those ends.

35.  Plato indicates that the knowledge of pure reason is preferable to conceptual understanding, because knowing that something is a certain kind of thing is not as good as knowing:
  (a) how we come to learn what to call a thing in virtue of our own experiences.
  (b) the logos or rationale of the thing, that is, why it is the way it is.
  (c) why we differ among ourselves about what we claim to know.
  (d) the difference between knowledge and opinion as outlined in Plato’s divided line image.

36. Like most rationalists, Plato defines knowledge as justified true belief.  In terms of this definition, we might be able to claim to know something as true which might actually be false, but it is impossible for us really to know something that is false.  Why?
 (a) Because to know something that is false is to know no real thing, nothing (i.e., not to know at all).
 (b) Because what we know as true is ultimately based on what we claim to know as true.
 (c) Because we cannot give a justification or reason for believing in something that is false.
 (d) Because in contrast to our knowledge of the unchanging Forms, beliefs about particular objects can change.

37. Plato distinguishes knowledge from mere belief or opinion by saying that knowledge must be a true belief for which one can give a justification, a rationale, or “logos.”  In terms of his image of the Divided Line, for Plato, knowledge is attained only when our sensible experience is:
  (a) grounded ultimately in what our senses reveal to us about the world of becoming.
  (b) based on images of the good, beauty, and truth obtained from particular objects and on which the concepts and Forms depend.
 (c) replaced by what we sincerely believe is true or have come to believe based on our upbringing.
  (d) understood in terms of concepts or innate ideas (Forms) that are perceived as rationally ordered.

38. According to Plato, we can attain knowledge only by seeing beyond this world of particular, changing objects to the true essences or Forms in terms of which things in this world are intelligible.  For example, we know what triangularity is not from comparing sensible triangles but by thinking of the ideal of triangularity in terms of which these sensible figures are recognized as triangles.  From this Plato concludes that all knowledge (as opposed to opinion) is innate, because:
  (a) from the moment we are born we know what things are in the world in terms of ideas that we get through our senses.
  (b) since we are born with senses (that is, our senses are innate), we can know things about the sensible world with certainty as long as we rely on the senses alone.
  (c) our knowledge of the world is not really of the sensible world itself but of the world grasped mathematically and ideally.
  (d) since our absolutely certain knowledge of things cannot be based on the changing things in sensible experience, it must merely be triggered by sensible experience.

39. In Plato’s idealism, the unchanging Ideas or “Forms” in terms of which sensible objects both exist and are known must transcend (that is, exist beyond) the changing realm of appearances; because if Forms changed, then:
  (a) the only things in the sensible world that we could ever experience would be concepts.
  (b) the sensible realm (in contrast to the intelligible realm) would consist only of copies of real things.
  (c) nothing in the experienced world could be or be identified as one determinate thing or another.
  (d) the sensible world would consist of unchanging Forms.

40. For Plato, ordinary sensible objects exist and are knowable as examples or instances of Ideas or “Forms” that do not exist in our ordinary sensible world.  Forms do not exist in the sensible world because:
  (a) in the sensible world only mathematical objects (e.g., triangles) can be known using hypotheses which are recollected when we are asked the right kinds of questions.
  (b) unlike everything in the sensible world, Forms are not individual things but rather the universal essences or natures by which individual things are what they are and are known.
  (c) nothing in the sensible, experienced world could exist or be identified as one particular thing or another unless there were a “Sensible World” Form (like the Form of beauty or justice).
  (d) the sensible world consists of changing Forms that exist and are known in terms of other changing Forms, which in turn exist and are known in terms of yet others in an endless regress.

41. “When a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world. . . . Dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure.”  Here Plato indicates how hypothetical knowledge cannot provide the foundation of dialectical knowledge, insofar as hypotheses simply:
  (a) explain sense experiences in terms of general concepts which themselves are not explained.
  (b) show how particular objects of experience cause us to recall innate ideas.
  (c) describe sense experience without providing an explanation for dialectical methods.
  (d) reject the use of reason, preferring instead dialectic, to achieve knowledge.

42. Plato’s suggestion that knowledge is innate or remembered as a result of being triggered by experience is in response to a paradox he sets up for himself.  The paradox, now referred to as Meno’s Paradox, has to do with the question of:
  (a) how a person can remember anything about the realm of the Forms after the shock of being born into this world.
  (b) how knowledge of the Forms can ever be anything other than a generalization of experience.
  (c) how anyone can recognize the correct answer to a question without already knowing the answer.
  (d) how concepts bound to the realm of becoming have meaning only when associated with the realm of Being.

43.  In his discussion of the Divided Line, Plato says that, in contrast to mere belief or opinion, knowledge is a belief for which we give reasons or justifications by appealing:
  (a) to what our senses reveal to us about how things appear to us, not how they  really are.
  (b) beyond the Forms to images of goodness, beauty, and truth obtained from particular objects.
  (c) to what we sincerely believe is true about the Forms based on our experiences in the world.
  (d) beyond sense experience to unchanging ideas (Forms) that are perceived as rationally ordered.

 

 

44. Aristotle says  that what makes things be what they are–their essence–does not exist apart from individ-uals that exist in the world.  So if all the members of a species were destroyed, then their essence or form:

 (a) would likewise be destroyed.
  (b) would be destroyed only if there were no one around to remember the species.
  (c) would continue existing (as with Plato’s Forms) in some other realm of being.
  (d) would not be destroyed because there was no essence or form originally to be destroyed; there are only individuals, not universal essences or natures of things.
 

Answers:
 
 

1. B
2. A
3. B
4. B
5. B
6. A
7. A
8. B

9. A
10. A
11. A
12. B
13. A
14. B
15. B
16. A

17. B
18. C
19. D
20. B
21. B
22. C
23. A
24. B
 

 25. B
26. A
27. D
28. C
29. B
30. A
31. C
32. D

33. C
34. B
35. B
36. A
37. D
38. C
39. C
40. B
 

41. A
42. C
43. D
44. A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Phil 251: Intro. to Philosophy (Daniel) Test Questions: Ethics

True/False (True=A; False=B)

 1. To the extent that ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics raise questions about judgments relating to value, they are concerned with axiology.

 2. The philosophical attempt of ethics to provide a standard for evaluating laws, religions, customs, and individual preferences is itself based on each philosopher’s personal values.

 3. In the retributive notion of justice, the purpose of punishment is to change the person’s character so that he or she does not commit such offenses again.

 4. As a utilitarian justification for capital punishment, the reform theory recommends the reform of society at large through the elimination of threatening individuals in the community.

 5. Because retribution serves a purpose–namely, giving someone what is due to him or her–it is generally considered a utilitarian justification for punishment.

 6. According to the retributivist, the execution of criminals is a form of respect shown to them as beings capable of making free choices for which they should take responsibility.

  7. According to Socrates and Plato, we should act virtuously for the sake of others, regardless of whether acting morally improves our ability to discern what is good or to control our passions.

  8. According to Socrates and Plato, we can be truly happy only if we allow our reason or intellect to guide our emotions and appetites.

  9. The point of Plato’s story of the ring of Gyges is this: only a fool would act morally if he or she could get away with acting immorally.

  10. In responding to the story of the ring of Gyges, Plato argues that immorality can never be in someone’s ultimate self-interest because immoral people are never truly happy.

  11.  In Plato’s theory of the state, justice is ultimately achieved when the ruling class is able to do away with social inequalities by driving the military and working classes out of society.

  12.  For Plato, the moral balance or harmony of the three parts of the soul is a parallel to the condition of political harmony one must seek in the state.

  13.  According to Plato, the soul achieves balance or harmony only when reason controls both the spirited (or courageous) part of the soul and the soul’s appetites.

  14. According to Plato, moral goodness is achieved by eliminating the activities of the lower parts of the soul and acting solely on the basis of reason.

 15. In Epicurus’ version of hedonism, all decisions about how to live should be based on whether or not one’s actions will produce pleasure and avoid pain.

 16. For Epicurus, since death is the end of sensation (and therefore the end of all pain), death is a positive good that we should look forward to.

 17. Hedonism is a form of teleological ethical theory insofar as it recommends that we act so as to produce happiness (pleasure) as the consequence of our actions.

 18. The egoistic hedonist says that, if producing the greatest amount of pleasure for ourselves means that we have to take into account the pleasure of others, then we are under a moral obligation to do so.

 19. Stoics note that we accumulate power and wealth by restricting our desires to things over which we have control.

 20. According to the Stoics, the only way to fulfill our duty to live in harmony with the universe is to yield to our passions, desires, and emotions.

 21. For the Stoic, the reason one does one’s duty is that it is the only way that a person can achieve true happiness.

 22.  According to Aristotle, because moral virtues are habits, they cannot be taught but only learned in living according to them.

 23.  According to Aristotle, in a good or happy life someone is able to fulfill himself or herself through behavior that combines moderation, good fortune, and wisdom.

 24. According to Aristotle, because happiness is not only the goal of all human beings but also defined by anyone as he/she sees fit, there is no ultimate standard of ethics.

 25. In Aristotle’s virtue ethics, moral value is a purely private matter, unconnected to how people interact with others in the community.

 26. Because hedonism is a consequentialist way of thinking, it is more properly identified as a form of ethical egoism rather than as a form of psychological egoism.

27. Teleological theories of ethics determine the moral value of actions in terms of their consequences.
 
 28. Though both Epicurus and Bentham agree that we should do that which produces pleasure or happiness, they differ on whose pleasure or happiness should be taken into account.

29. If psychological egoism is true, then no ethical position (including ethical egoism) is possible.

 30.  Because ethical egoism claims that we are incapable of doing anything other than promoting our self-interests, it violates the moral dictum “ought implies can.”

 31. For the utilitarian, the whole purpose of ethics and virtuous behavior is the production and increase of happiness.

 32. According to the utilitarian principle of morality, one should always act so as to produce the greatest overall and long-term amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.

 33. Utilitarians claim that actions have value and thus are morally good insofar as they produce happiness (good consequences) for the greatest number of people.

 34.  Since utilitarianism is really a form of social hedonism, it cannot be considered as a consequentialist theory of morality.

 35. Because Bentham’s hedonistic calculus does not consider the pleasures or pains that other people experience as a result of a person’s action, it is more egoistic than Mill’s version of utilitarianism.

 36.  According to Mill, the proof that happiness is good (and thus desirable) is that human beings desire it.

 37. Utilitarians argue that, because all moral values are relative to cultural or individual choice, no universally valid moral principles hold for all human beings.

 38. According to J. S. Mill, the quantity (as opposed to the quality) of pleasures is determined by how well those pleasures enhance human fulfillment and well-being.

 39. A deontological ethical theory is one that makes judgments about the morality of actions based on the ends, purposes, or consequences of the actions.

 40. A person who has a moral obligation to do something is not physically able or free to do anything else.

 41. Kant rejects all forms of hypothetical imperatives because (he claims) no rational agent can ever be obligated to act morally.

 42. Kant’s categorical imperative states that we should always act for the sake of doing our duty except when doing our duty conflicts with deeply held personal or religious values.

 43.  To act virtuously, Kant argues, means to act for the sake of doing one’s duty—even if that means going against one’s religious beliefs.

 44. In Kantian ethics (following Hume), “ought implies can” refers to the claim that no one can be morally obligated to do something unless he or she is able to do it.

 45. “Ought implies can” summarizes the moral principle that if someone is physically able to do an action, he or she is morally obligated to do it.

 46. To say that a moral imperative is categorical means (for Kant) that the demand should be obeyed without exception, regardless of the negative consequences of acting on it.

 47. Teleological ethical theories characterize moral obligation in terms of categorical rather than hypothetical imperatives.

 48. From Kant’s perspective, utilitarian consequentialism assumes that ethical reasoning is and should be based on a categorical (rather than a hypothetical) imperative.

 49. According to Kant, I can be morally obligated to do an action only if everyone else in the same type of situation is likewise obligated.

 50. A maxim is a subjective principle of action or working rule which, according to Kant, we are morally bound or obligated to obey.

 51. According to Kant, we should treat people as ends-in-themselves (and never as means alone) because they produce good consequences through their actions.

 52. According to Hume and Moore, ethical theories fall into a naturalistic fallacy when they derive moral obligations (“should” or “ought”) from factual states (“is”).

 53. Utilitarians commit a “naturalistic fallacy” by thinking that certain behavior is morally desirable because it has consequences that are desired.

 54. According to emotivism (or “positivism”) value judgments are simply expressions of positive or negative feelings about something and thus are neither true nor false.

 55.  For Sartre, belief in God permits individuals to depend on a standard of morality for which they are not responsible and for which they are not accountable.

 56.  According to Sartre, nothing that a human being does, not even acting in “bad faith,” allows that person to transcend human subjectivity.

 57.  Moral systems—even those that value humility and passivity—are expressions (Nietzsche maintains) of the will to power, the will to overcome.

 58.  According to Nietzsche, moral systems are attempts by the masses of weak people to keep strong individuals from exercising their creativity and passion.

 59.  Nietzsche rejects utilitarianism because it gives equal value to all individuals, even those who do not deserve it.

 60. Nietzsche rejects moral theories such as Christian, utilitarian, and Kantian ethics because they fail to treat all human beings as essentially equal.

61. Ethical relativists claim that cultures ultimately share the same basic ethical principles.

 62. Ethical relativists claim that even though cultures seem to differ on ethical standards, they ultimately share the same basic ethical principle–namely, moral goodness is that which produces happiness.

 63  Ethical relativists argue that, because all moral values are relative to cultural or individual choice, no universally valid moral principles hold for all human beings.

 64.  For the cultural relativist, if a moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, it is right (at least within that society).

65.  If moral objectivism is true, then homosexuality must be morally wrong.

 66. According to Kohlberg, the highest stage of moral development–the postconventional acceptance of rational, objective principles–is a stage in which people become slaves to rules, laws, or traditions.

 67. According to Carol Gilligan, the ethic of care characteristic of feminist ways of thinking emphasizes the obligation not to interfere in the lives of others.

 68. Feminine moral development, according to Carol Gilligan, occurs as a person moves from (1) caring only for herself, through (2) caring for others, to (3) adopting care as a universal moral principle.

 69. Sarah Hoagland argues that male-dominated ethics emphasizes competing interests, sacrifice and compromise, and duty instead of caring.
 

 

Multiple Choice

70. Ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics are areas of philosophy that address topics that are likewise addressed in fields like psychology, political science, sociology, and anthropology.  But instead of concentrating on what different people call the good life, moral duties, social obligations, or beauty, these areas of philosophy search for:
 (a) reasons why different people should or should not think about such topics as they do.
 (b) the personal or social causes of why different people think about such topics as they do.
 (c) ways of getting people to question and ultimately to reject ways they have been raised.
 (d) a basic principle or logos by which both philosophy and the social sciences can be reduced to the physical sciences (especially physics).

71. Ethics and law have sometimes been distinguished in the following way:  the law attempts to resolve conflict in society by regulating behavior, whereas ethics is concerned with determining the rules for resolving conflict both in belief and in the behavior or action based on those beliefs.  Ethics thus emphasizes:
  (a) the reasons that can be given as to why certain beliefs should be adopted and certain actions done.
  (b) the ways in which individuals can be excused from being held responsible for their actions.
  (c) how a rational resolution of conflicting beliefs is unattainable due to the different backgrounds of people.
  (d) the difference between an individual’s religious training and the requirements of the laws of his state and nation.

72. From a philosophical perspective, religious teachings or revelations cannot (by themselves) serve as standards of morality because:
  (a) the appeal to the will of God as the reason for one’s behavior cannot provide a motive for acting morally or immorally, even for religious believers.
  (b) interpretations of religious revelations often conflict with one another and thus provide no definite basis for making moral judgments and have no persuasive power for non-believers.
  (c) some religious beliefs (even those based on the Scriptures) are not only factually wrong but, if followed, would result in immoral behavior.
  (d) religious teachings are usually interpreted and enforced through civil laws that become the bases for personal or social morality.

73. According to Plato, no one would choose to act immorally if he/she knew how acting immorally is really not in his/her self-interest.  But it is apparent that evil people appear (at least on the surface) to benefit from their immorality.  So how can acting morally really be in one’s own self-interest?  Plato’s answer:
  (a) Immoralbehavior may in fact be in one’s own self-interest; but morality is not immediately concerned with the individual as much as with society.
  (b) Harmonious integration or balance of the parts of one’s personality is what makes someone truly happy and constitutes human excellence and moral virtue.
  (c) Since there is no objective moral standard (as the ring of Gyges story shows), whatever someone believes is in his or her self-interest is morally acceptable.
  (d) Virtue is the ability to do what one does well, so if someone is able to promote his or her self interest (even through immorality), then that person is virtuous.

74. According to Plato, we never consciously choose to do that which we know to be immoral, because to do so would be to act contrary to our own self-interests.  Knowing what is in our own self-interest, however, requires that we recognize which things are truly in our best interests; and that requires that we recognize:
  (a) how those in power determine what is moral or immoral depending on whatever they choose to believe.
  (b) how personal integrity (i.e., getting the parts of our soul into harmony) is linked to knowing our function in society.
  (c) how wisdom is possible only for the ruling class, courage is possible only for the military or law enforcers, and moderation is possible only for the working class.
  (d) how morality is less concerned with doing what is actually right than with doing what seems to be right according to one’s society: that is what the Gyges ring story is about.

75. For most Greeks, the question “why be moral?” is much more important than the question “what is moral?”  Plato’s parallel between the parts of the soul and the parts of society collapses the two questions into one by:
  (a) showing why someone should care about having an integrated personality or contributing to the harmonious operation of society.
  (b) understanding how ethics is more concerned with intellectual judgments about actions and their consequences, and less with moral motivation.
  (c) recognizing that personal morality has little or nothing to do with social morality; that is, one’s private moral judgments have no social parallels.
  (d) indicating how the judgments of society concerning who is happy and who is not should be used in telling who is moral and who is not.

76. To say that Plato’s question “Why be moral?” is not a moral, but rather a meta-ethical question means that it is a question about:
  (a) what makes certain actions moral or immoral.
  (b) how individuals should or should not be held responsible for the ways in which their consciences have been formed.
  (c) why someone should behave in certain ways, even when he agrees that it is the morally acceptable way to act.
  (d) why someone chooses to act in ways that conflict with the recommendations of others.

77. “Why be moral?” is a metaethical question rather than an ethical question insofar as it is concerned with:
  (a) why someone would want to have a balanced personality or be a superior individual.
  (b) non-moral reasons for why someone should be moral.
  (c) how it is morally wrong for someone to be immoral.
  (d) what makes actions moral or immoral, right or wrong.

78. Epicurus proposes that, even though decision-making should be based on the pursuit of pleasure, not all pleasures ought to be pursued equally, because:
  (a) pleasures are the fulfillment of our desires; and insofar as we are determined by nature to fulfill our desires, we must seek after pleasure.
  (b) we ought not to get pleasure out of fulfilling certain desires.
  (c) we cannot make decisions based on whether our actions produce pleasure without knowing beforehand whether we are justified in doing so.
  (d) simple pleasures (as opposed to extreme pleasures) are easier to satisfy, less prone to disappointment, and make us appreciate luxuries all the more.

79.  Every time we succeed in any endeavor, we experience pleasure in having accomplished our goals.  But what if our goals involve causing harm to oneself or to others?–Wouldn’t that indicate that the hedonistic pursuit of pleasure is wrong and should not be the basis of a moral system?  To this a hedonist like Epicurus would reply:
  (a) hedonism is not a way of life or a way of deciding how to act morally; it is merely a way of thinking.
  (b) if pursuing certain goals causes someone pleasure, that is all that matters; how others are affected or how they respond to the individual’s acts is unimportant.
  (c) hedonism recommends that those kinds of endeavors that cause pain or unhappiness be avoided; it does not say that any successful effort whatsoever is desirable.
  (d) no one intentionally pursues or should pursue pleasure for its own sake; we should avoid worrying about morality as well.

80. Though Epicurean hedonism is similar in certain respects to modern Western capitalism, it emphasizes a point that Marx says characterizes his position as well, namely, the belief that:
  (a) we should not trouble ourselves about things (e.g., economic systems) over which we have no control.
  (b) happiness should not be defined in terms of material things, since in the afterlife they mean nothing.
  (c) only the material world is real and life has meaning only in terms of this world; there is no afterlife.
  (d) work is a necessary evil one has to endure to obtain the means to develop friendships and gain wisdom.

81. Critics have claimed that Hobbes’ egoistic theory of human motivation (including his denial that anyone can ever act in a purely altruistic way) is not properly a scientific theory because it fails to fulfill Popper’s falsifiability criterion for scientific theories.  Specifically, in order for Hobbes’ position to be considered a legitimate theory:
 (a) it must be shown to be false.
 (b) it would allow for the possibility that it could be false.
 (c) it must be able to explain all behavior in terms of self-interest.
 (d) it would have to show how believing in the theory is in one’s self-interest.

82. Though systems of belief such as fatalism, determinism, and egoism provide their supporters with ways of explaining experience, these ways of thinking cannot be considered acceptable theories of human behavior because they violate the falsifiability criterion for legitimate theorizing.  They cannot be proven false because:
 (a) such systems of belief are simply true–as the failure of all attempted falsifications of them shows.
 (b) people who believed in them would be determined by fate to act always in their own self-interest.
 (c) there are no explanations of human behavior other than those proposed by these systems of belief.
 (d) any attempt to falsify them would be explained in their terms, supposedly confirming their truth.

83. According to Ayn Rand’s version of ethical egoism, it is not only possible for us to act in ways that beefit others; it is important that we do so, but only to the extent that:
 (a) our own self-interests are promoted through the promotion of the interests of others.
 (b) we act compassionately, not always seeking to promote our interests over others.
 (c) we act altruistically.
 (d) our lives incorporate the goals of asceticism (that is, simplicity and self-denial).

84. If psychological egoism is true, then no ethical system (including ethical egoism) is possible because:
  (a) ethics would then be merely a means by which individuals impose their values on others–exactly as Nietzsche says happens in Christianity.
  (b) if we are determined to act only in our self-interest, then it makes no sense to say we ought to act either in our self-interest or, for that matter, in any other way either.
  (c) psychological egoism is a theory of why people are motivated to act morally, whereas ethical egoism is a theory of how moral distinctions are determined.
  (d) without some means to decide which acts are morally good or bad, there is no way to explain why people act the way they do.
 
85. Stoics like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius describe the good life in terms of a rational understanding of the law of nature, because insofar as we understand natural law:
 (a) we can change nature to accommodate our interests.
 (b) we can get pleasure out of the pure act of knowing.
 (c) we can limit our desires to things within our control.
 (d) we can remain indifferent about what we choose to do.

86. For the Stoic a meaningful life is one in which she commits herself to do her duty, whatever it might be.  Limiting herself to doing her duty (regardless of what that entails) means:
  (a) recognizing how her freedom is limited by what she chooses to desire.
  (b) passively resigning herself to accept whatever happens as out of her control and unaffected by her action.
  (c) committing herself with all her power to take responsibility for what she does as her own.
  (d) not caring what she does or how she does it, as long as she thinks she won’t be disappointed by taking unnecessary chances.

87. Epictetus’ Stoic claim that we should be happy with whatever life offers us differs from Epicureanism in that:
  (a) Epicureanism says that happiness consists in the unrestrained pursuit of pleasure (hedonism), whereas Stoicism says that we can achieve pleasure only by desiring things that will not disappoint us.
  (b) Epicureanism says that life can be meaningful only if we are happy (regardless of whether we satisfy our desires), but Stoicism says that we can be happy only if we satisfy our desires.
  (c) Epicureanism says that only those things that benefit us can make us happy, whereas Stoicism says only by doing things that benefit others can we be happy.
  (d) Epicureanism says we should desire things that do not disappoint us, whereas Stoicism says that we cannot be disappointed in life if we do not desire anything.

88. Existentialism differs significantly from Stoicism concerning why we should care about the specifics of what we choose as values.  The Stoic says we should care about doing our duty; but what that duty might be is something, the Stoic claims, is ultimately due to nature.  This is where the existentialist would object, claiming:
  (a) in spite of the fact that nature restricts what we can choose to do, we can still have an effect on human values by the choices we make.
  (b) values established in nature guide our choices and indicate what our duties are, but they do not force us to act in accord with those values.
  (c) freedom requires that we respond with scornful and grudging acceptance of the values implicit in the structure and laws of nature.
  (d) nature itself has meaning for humans only insofar as we choose to consider it as valuable, so our choices are not determined by nature.

Phil 251: Intro to Philosophy (Daniel) Test Questions: Ethics

Answers at end.

True/False (True=A, False=B)

1.  To the extent that ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics raise questions about judgments relating to value, they are concerned with axiology.

2.  The philosophical attempt of ethics to provide a standard for evaluating laws, religions, customs, and individual preferences is itself based on each philosopher’s personal values.

3.  Because ethics studies moral values and obligations, it is concerned with consequences of action, not motives.

4.  According to Socrates and Plato, we should act virtuously for the sake of others, regardless of whether acting morally improves our ability to discern what is good or to control our passions.

5.  According to Socrates and Plato, we can be truly happy only if we allow our reason or intellect to guide our emotions and appetites.

6.  According to Socrates, because an immoral person is unable to integrate the various parts of his/her character or personality, no immoral person can really be happy.

7.  According to Socrates and Plato, even though an immoral person is unable to integrate the various parts of his/her character or personality, he or she can still really be happy.

8.  The characters in Plato’s Republic appeal to the story of the ring of Gyges to make the point that only a fool would act morally if he or she could get away with acting immorally.

9.  In responding to the story of the ring of Gyges, Plato argues that immorality can never be in someone’s ultimate self-interest because immoral people are never truly happy.

10.  In Plato’s theory of the state, justice is ultimately achieved when the ruling class is able to do away with social inequalities by driving the military and working classes out of society.

11.  For Plato, the moral balance or harmony of the three parts of the soul is parallel to the condition of political harmony one must seek in the state.

12.  According to Plato, the soul achieves balance or harmony only when reason controls both the spirited (or courageous) part of the soul and the soul’s appetites.

13.  According to Plato, moral goodness is achieved by eliminating the activities of the lower parts of the soul and acting solely on the basis of reason.

14.  Teleological theories of ethics determine the moral value of actions in terms of their consequences.

15.  In Epicurus’ hedonism, moral decisions should be based on whether actions produce pleasure and avoid pain.

16.  Hedonism is a form of teleological ethical theory insofar as it recommends that we act so as to produce happiness (pleasure) as the consequence of our actions.

17.  The egoistic hedonist says that, if producing the greatest amount of pleasure for ourselves means that we have to take into account the pleasure of others, then we are under a moral obligation to do so.

18.  If psychological egoism is true, then no ethical position (including ethical egoism) is possible.

19.  To say that egoism is non-falsifiable (and thus not a legitimate philosophical theory) means that it is impossible for everyone to be an egoist.

20.  Because ethical egoism claims that we are incapable of doing anything other than promoting our self-interests, it violates the moral dictum “ought implies can.”

21.  To say that “ought implies can” means that a person can be under a moral obligation to do something only if that person is able to do otherwise.

22.  “Ought implies can” summarizes the moral principle that if someone is physically able to do an action, he or she is morally obligated to do it.

23.  Because ethical egoism is concerned only with the pleasure or happiness of the person doing the action, it is not a form of teleological ethics.

24.  The ethical egoist says that, since it is impossible for us to do anything other than promote our own self-interest, it is pointless for us to develop a moral theory that indicates what we “ought” to do.

25.  For the utilitarian, the whole purpose of ethics and virtuous behavior is the production and increase of happiness.

26.  According to the utilitarian principle of morality, one should always act so as to produce the greatest overall and long-term amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.

27.  Utilitarians claim that actions have value and thus are morally good insofar as they produce happiness (good consequences) for the greatest number of people.

28.  Since utilitarianism is really a form of social hedonism, it cannot be considered as a consequentialist theory of morality.

29.  Like egoism, utilitarianism is a form of teleological ethics because it emphasizes using consequences as the basis for determining the morality of actions.

30.  Though both Epicurus and Bentham agree that we should do that which produces pleasure or happiness, they differ on whose pleasure or happiness should be taken into account.

31.  Because Bentham’s hedonic calculus does not consider the pleasures or pains that other people experience as a result of a person’s action, it is more egoistic than Mill’s version of utilitarianism.

32.  According to Mill, the proof that happiness is good (and thus desirable) is that human beings desire it.

33.  According to J. S. Mill, we should focus on the quality of happiness produced by acts and ignore the quantity.

34.  According to J. S. Mill, the quantity (as opposed to the quality) of pleasures is determined by how well those pleasures enhance human fulfillment and well-being.

35.  According to Mill, the decision about which pleasures are qualitatively desirable should be made by people familiar with different kinds of pleasures based on what they generally desire.

36.  John Stuart Mill claims that what makes happiness desirable (and thus the basis for what ought to be desired) is the fact that happiness is desired.

37.  Utilitarians argue that, because all moral values are relative to cultural or individual choice, no universally valid moral principles hold for all human beings.

38.  Act utilitarians point out that, because violating a moral rule sometimes causes more happiness than following the rule, we are not only allowed to violate the rule, but we are morally obligated to violate it.

39.  Rule utilitarians claim that we should follow moral rules even if we think that violating them would yield better results, because following moral rules generally yields more overall happiness.

40.  Utilitarianism is a form of deontological ethics because it uses consequences to determine the morality of acts.

41.  Teleological ethical theories characterize moral obligation in terms of categorical rather than hypothetical imperatives.

42.  A deontological ethical theory is one that makes judgments about the morality of actions based on the ends, purposes, or consequences of the actions.

43.  Divine-command ethical theorists claim that what makes actions moral or immoral is God’s command that we act or refrain from acting in certain ways.

44.  According to critics of divine-command theory, to say that God is good is redundant because any being who commands another destroys the other’s ability to act freely.

45.  A person who has a moral obligation to do something is not physically able or free to do anything else.

46.  Kant rejects all forms of hypothetical imperatives because (he claims) no rational agent can ever be obligated to act morally.

47.  According to Kant, morality presumes that I, as a rational being, am able to do what is morally right because it is morally right.

48.  According to Kant, my actions are morally good only if my motives or intentions in so acting are for the sake of or because it is my duty to act in those ways.

49.  According to Kant, before we can decide what is morally valuable, we must decide what we are obligated to do.

50.  Kant’s categorical imperative states that we should always act for the sake of doing our duty except when doing our duty conflicts with deeply held personal or religious values.

51.  For Kant, the only time someone is morally permitted to act contrary to the dictates of a moral law is when such a universalizable maxim comes into conflict with one’s deeply held religious beliefs.

52.  To act virtuously, Kant argues, means to act for the sake of doing one’s duty—even if that means going against one’s religious beliefs.

53.  Because the categorical imperative does not admit of any exceptions, Kant concludes that it is impossible for anyone to do anything that would violate it.

54.  Even though the categorical imperative does not admit of any exceptions, Kant acknowledges that it is possible for people to violate it (that is, to be immoral).

55.  In Kantian ethics (following Hume), “ought implies can” refers to the claim that no one can be morally obligated to do something unless he or she is able to do it.

56.  “Ought implies can” summarizes the moral principle that if someone is physically able to do an action (e.g., kill someone), he or she is morally obligated to do it.

57.  To say that a moral imperative is categorical means (for Kant) that the demand should be obeyed without exception, regardless of the negative consequences of acting on it.

58.  From Kant’s perspective, utilitarian consequentialism assumes that ethical reasoning is and should be based on a categorical (rather than a hypothetical) imperative.

59.  According to Kant, an action which has a motive or intention that cannot be successfully universalized might be moral or immoral depending on whether the action is done freely.

60.  According to Kant, I can be morally obligated to do an action only if everyone else in the same type of situation is likewise obligated.

61.  A maxim is a subjective principle of action or working rule which, according to Kant, we are morally bound or obligated to obey.

62.  According to Kant, a good will is a will to do what is what we are morally obligated to do (that is, our duty) regardless of the consequences.

63.  For Kant, I determine whether I am morally obligated to act a certain way by seeing whether the motive of my action can be universalized without contradiction or without being unacceptable to some people.

64.  According to Kant, we should treat people as ends-in-themselves (and never as means alone) because of the good consequences of doing so.

65.  According to Hume and Moore, ethical theories fall into a naturalistic fallacy when they derive moral obligations (“should” or “ought”) from factual states (“is”).

66.  Utilitarians commit a “naturalistic fallacy” by thinking that certain behavior is morally desirable because it has consequences that are desired.

67.  According to emotivism (or “positivism”) value judgments are simply expressions of positive or negative feelings about something and thus are neither true nor false.

68.  According to logical positivists, ethical judgments are meaningful (and thus can be justified) because they describe a fact about the world–namely, certain actions produce happiness and ought to be done.

69.  For Sartre, individuals who believe in God depend on a standard of morality for which they are not responsible and for which they are not accountable.

70.  According to Sartre, every time I do something, I identify that kind of action as a standard of morality for all human beings.

71.  According to Sartre, nothing that a human being does, not even acting in “bad faith,” allows that person to transcend human subjectivity.

72.  According to existentialist ethics, because there is no absolute foundation upon which moral judgments are based, we cannot justifiably be held responsible for our choice of any set of values.

73.  Moral systems—even those that value humility and passivity—are expressions (Nietzsche maintains) of the will to power, the will to overcome.

74.  Even though Nietzsche suggests that all reality is interpreted, he does not claim that truth itself is an expression of the will to power.

75.  According to Nietzsche, moral systems are attempts by the masses of weak people to keep strong individuals from exercising their creativity and passion.

76.  For Nietzsche, because morality is an expression of a slave mentality, no creative (“master”) individual can really be called excellent, honorable, or noble.

77.  Nietzsche claims that those who adopt the master morality promote the common good and peace in society in order to develop all forms of life as expressions of the will to power.

78.  Nietzsche rejects utilitarianism because it gives equal value to all individuals, even those who do not deserve it.

79.  Nietzsche rejects moral theories such as Christian, utilitarian, and Kantian ethics because they fail to treat all human beings as essentially equal.

80.  Nietzsche claims that religion stands in the way of true human development to the extent that religious beliefs prevent us from making the authentic commitment to God necesssary for true salvation.

81.  Ethical relativists claim that cultures ultimately share the same basic ethical principles.

82.  Ethical relativists claim that even though cultures seem to differ on ethical standards, they ultimately share the same basic ethical principle–namely, moral goodness is that which produces happiness.

83.  Ethical relativists argue that, because all moral values are relative to cultural or individual choice, no universally valid moral principles hold for all human beings.

84.  For the cultural relativist, if a moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, it is right (at least within that society).

85.  Cultural relativism commits the “naturalistic fallacy” to the extent that it assumes that, because cultures differ about moral judgments, they are justified in holding their beliefs.

86.  According to conventional ethical relativism, we should tolerate the values of other cultures because there is no independent basis for criticizing those values.

87.  According to ethical subjectivists, moral values are based solely on an individual’s beliefs.

88.  An ethical relativist cannot be a moral objectivist.

89.  It is impossible for an ethical absolutist to be a moral relativist.

90.  If moral objectivism is true, then homosexuality must be morally wrong.

91.  According to Carol Gilligan, the ethic of care characteristic of feminist ways of thinking emphasizes the obligation not to interfere in the lives of others.

92.  Feminine moral development, according to Carol Gilligan, occurs as a person moves from (1) caring only for herself, through (2) caring for others, to (3) adopting care as a universal moral principle.

93.  Sarah Hoagland argues that male-dominated ethics emphasizes competing interests, sacrifice and compromise, and duty instead of caring.

94.  Drawing on insights like those developed in ancient Greek virtue ethics, feminists point out that the aim of ethics should be to protect individual rights and to treat everyone in the same impartial, just way.

95.  According to Aristotle, because moral virtues are habits, they cannot be taught but only learned in living according to them.

96.  According to Aristotle, in a good or happy life someone is able to fulfill himself or herself through behavior that combines moderation, good fortune, and wisdom.

97.  According to Aristotle, because happiness is not only the goal of all human beings but also defined by anyone as he/she sees fit, there is no ultimate standard of ethics.

98.  In Aristotle’s virtue ethics, moral value is a purely private matter, unconnected to how people interact with others in the community.

99.  According to virtue ethics, moral behavior is a balance of reason and emotional sensitivity to the needs and relations of individuals that does not aim at the indifferent application of abstract principles.

100.  According to deep ecologists, we are justified in promoting our own self-realization by using natural resources however we want because God has given us everything in the world for our benefit.

101.  Deep ecologists argue that all forms of life are valuable—but only insofar as they promote human well-being.
 

Multiple Choice

102.  Ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics are areas of philosophy that address topics that are likewise addressed in fields like psychology, political science, sociology, and anthropology.  But instead of concentrating on what different people call the good life, moral duties, social obligations, or beauty, these areas of philosophy search for:
  (a) reasons why different people should or should not think about such topics as they do.
  (b) the personal or social causes of why different people think about such topics as they do.
  (c) ways of getting people to question and ultimately to reject ways they have been raised.
  (d) a basic principle or logos by which both philosophy and the social sciences can be reduced to the physical sciences (especially physics).

103.  Ethics and law have sometimes been distinguished in the following way:  the law attempts to resolve conflict in society by regulating behavior, whereas ethics is concerned with determining the rules for resolving conflict both in belief and in the behavior or action based on those beliefs.  Ethics thus emphasizes:
  (a) the reasons that can be given as to why certain beliefs should be adopted and certain actions done.
  (b) the ways in which individuals can be excused from being held responsible for their actions.
  (c) how a rational resolution of conflicting beliefs is unattainable due to the different backgrounds of people.
  (d) the difference between an individual’s religious training and the requirements of the laws of his state and nation.

104.  Unlike religion, law, social custom, or personal preference, ethics is not concerned with describing our behavior in terms of faith, social order, or individual likes and dislikes.  Instead, it focuses on:
  (a) describing how each person’s background and upbringing affects his or her beliefs about moral issues.
  (b) showing how religion, law, and social custom are culturally relative, but personal preference is subjective.
  (c) showing how motives are more crucial in making moral judgments than consideration of consequences, character, or the act itself.
  (d) explaining why we might or might not be justified in applying those other sets of beliefs to moral issues.

105.  From a philosophical perspective, religious teachings or revelations cannot (by themselves) serve as standards of morality because:
  (a) the appeal to the will of God as the reason for one’s behavior cannot provide a motive for acting morally or immorally, even for religious believers.
  (b) interpretations of religious revelations often conflict with one another and thus provide no definite basis for making moral judgments and have no persuasive power for non-believers.
  (c) some religious beliefs (even those based on the Scriptures) are not only factually wrong but, if followed, would result in immoral behavior.
  (d) religious teachings are usually interpreted and enforced through civil laws that become the bases for personal or social morality.

106.  According to Plato, no one would choose to act immorally if he/she knew how acting immorally is really not in his/her self-interest.  But it is apparent that evil people appear (at least on the surface) to benefit from their immorality.  So how can acting morally really be in one’s own self-interest?  Plato’s answer:
  (a) Immoralbehavior may in fact be in one’s own self-interest; but morality is not immediately concerned with the individual as much as with society.
  (b) Harmonious integration or balance of the parts of one’s personality is what makes someone truly happy and constitutes human excellence and moral virtue.
  (c) Since there is no objective moral standard (as the ring of Gyges story shows), whatever someone believes is in his or her self-interest is morally acceptable.
  (d) Virtue is the ability to do what one does well, so if someone is able to promote his or her self interest (even through immorality), then that person is virtuous.

107.  For Plato, acting morally benefits society at the same time as it promotes our own self-interest because:
  (a) those who are in power determine morality depending on what they choose to believe benefits them.
  (b) personal integrity (i.e., harmonizing the parts of our soul) is based on knowing our function in society.
  (c) only the rulers (vs. law enforcers or workers) can really be moral since only the rulers act on reason.
  (d) morality is less concerned with doing what is actually right than with doing what seems to be right according to one’s society: that is what the Gyges ring story is about.

108.  For most Greeks, the question “why be moral?” is much more important than the question “what is moral?”  Plato’s parallel between the parts of the soul and the parts of society collapses the two questions into one by:
  (a) showing why someone should care about having an integrated personality or contributing to the harmonious operation of society.
  (b) understanding how ethics is more concerned with intellectual judgments about actions and their consequences, and less with moral motivation.
  (c) recognizing that personal morality has little or nothing to do with social morality; that is, one’s private moral judgments have no social parallels.
  (d) indicating how the judgments of society concerning who is happy and who is not should be used in telling who is moral and who is not.

109.  To say that Plato’s question “Why be moral?” is not a moral, but rather a meta-ethical question means that it is a question about:
  (a) what makes certain actions moral or immoral.
  (b) how individuals should or should not be held responsible for the ways in which their consciences have been formed.
  (c) why someone should behave in certain ways, even when he agrees that it is the morally acceptable way to act.
  (d) why someone chooses to act in ways that conflict with the recommendations of others.

110.  “Why be moral?” is a metaethical question rather than an ethical question insofar as it is concerned with:
  (a) why someone would want to have a balanced personality or be a superior individual.
  (b) non-moral reasons for why someone should be moral.
  (c) how it is morally wrong for someone to be immoral.
  (d) what makes actions moral or immoral, right or wrong.

111.  Epicurus proposes that, even though decision-making should be based on the pursuit of pleasure, not all pleasures ought to be pursued equally, because:
  (a) pleasures are the fulfillment of our desires; and insofar as we are determined by nature to fulfill our desires, we must seek after pleasure.
  (b) we ought not to get pleasure out of fulfilling certain desires.
  (c) we cannot make decisions based on whether our actions produce pleasure without knowing beforehand whether we are justified in doing so.
  (d) simple pleasures (as opposed to extreme pleasures) are easier to satisfy, less prone to disappointment, and make us appreciate luxuries all the more.

112.  Epicurus says that the pursuit of pleasure is good, but not all pleasures ought to be pursued equally because:
  (a) not everyone agrees that beauty, prudence, honor, justice, courage, or knowledge are pleasurable.
  (b) some pleasures (e.g., satisfaction of vain desires) are associated with pain (e.g., disappointment).
  (c) even pleasures such as courage and knowledge have as much pain associated with them as vain desires.
  (d) pain and pleasure is always relative to the individual.

113.  Every time we succeed in any endeavor, we experience pleasure in having accomplished our goals.  But what if our goals involve causing harm to oneself or to others?–Wouldn’t that indicate that the hedonistic pursuit of pleasure is wrong and should not be the basis of a moral system?  To this a hedonist like Epicurus would reply:
  (a) hedonism is not a way of life or a way of deciding how to act morally; it is merely a way of thinking.
  (b) if pursuing certain goals causes someone pleasure, that is all that matters; how others are affected or how they respond to the individual’s acts is unimportant.
  (c) hedonism recommends that those kinds of endeavors that cause pain or unhappiness be avoided; it does not say that any successful effort whatsoever is desirable.
  (d) no one intentionally pursues or should pursue pleasure for its own sake; we should avoid worrying about morality as well.

114.  Critics have claimed that Hobbes’ egoistic theory of human motivation (including his denial that anyone can ever act in a purely altruistic way) is not properly a scientific theory because it fails to fulfill Popper’s falsifiability criterion for scientific theories.  Specifically, in order for Hobbes’ position to be considered a legitimate theory:
 (a) it must be shown to be false.
 (b) it would allow for the possibility that it could be false.
 (c) it must be able to explain all behavior in terms of self-interest.
 (d) it would have to show how believing in the theory is in one’s self-interest.

115.  Though systems of belief such as fatalism, determinism, and egoism provide their supporters with ways of explaining experience, these ways of thinking cannot be considered acceptable theories of human behavior because they violate the falsifiability criterion for legitimate theorizing.  They cannot be proven false because:
  (a) such systems of belief are simply true–as the failure of all attempted falsifications of them shows.
  (b) people who believed in them would be determined by fate to act always in their own self-interest.
  (c) there are no explanations of human behavior other than those proposed by these systems of belief.
  (d) any attempt to falsify them would be explained in their terms, supposedly confirming their truth.

116.  If psychological egoism is true, then no ethical system (including ethical egoism) is possible because:
  (a) ethics would then be merely a means by which individuals impose their values on others–exactly as Nietzsche says happens in Christianity.
  (b) if we are determined to act only in our self-interest, then it makes no sense to say we ought to act either in our self-interest or, for that matter, in any other way either.
  (c) psychological egoism is a theory of why people are motivated to act morally, whereas ethical egoism is a theory of how moral distinctions are determined.
  (d) without some means to decide which acts are morally good or bad, there is no way to explain why people act the way they do.

117.  Ethical egoists dismiss psychological egoism because (they say) psychological egoism undermines the possibility for any ethical behavior by ignoring one of the basic principles of ethical reasoning, namely:
  (a) is implies ought.
  (b) the end never justifies the means.
  (c) the naturalistic fallacy.
  (d) ought implies can.

118.  Stoics like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius describe the good life in terms of a rational understanding of the law of nature, because insofar as we understand natural law:
 (a) we can change nature to accommodate our interests.
 (b) we can get pleasure out of the pure act of knowing.
 (c) we can limit our desires to things within our control.
 (d) we can remain indifferent about what we choose to do.

119.  For the Stoic a meaningful life is one in which she commits herself to do her duty, whatever it might be.  Limiting herself to doing her duty (regardless of what that entails) means:
  (a) recognizing how her freedom is limited by what she chooses to desire.
  (b) passively resigning herself to accept whatever happens as out of her control and unaffected by her action.
  (c) committing herself with all her power to take responsibility for what she does as her own.
  (d) not caring what she does or how she does it, as long as she thinks she won’t be disappointed by taking unnecessary chances.

120.  Epictetus’ Stoic claim that we should be happy with whatever life offers us differs from Epicureanism in that:
  (a) Epicureanism says that happiness consists in the unrestrained pursuit of pleasure (hedonism), whereas Stoicism says that we can achieve pleasure only by desiring things that will not disappoint us.
  (b) Epicureanism says that life can be meaningful only if we are happy (regardless of whether we satisfy our desires), but Stoicism says that we can be happy only if we satisfy our desires.
  (c) Epicureanism says that only those things that benefit us can make us happy, whereas Stoicism says only by doing things that benefit others can we be happy.
  (d) Epicureanism says we should desire things that do not disappoint us, whereas Stoicism says that we cannot be disappointed in life if we do not desire anything.

121.  Existentialism differs significantly from Stoicism concerning why we should care about the specifics of what we choose as values.  The Stoic says we should care about doing our duty; but what that duty might be is something, the Stoic claims, is ultimately due to nature.  This is where the existentialist would object, claiming:
  (a) in spite of the fact that nature restricts what we can choose to do, we can still have an effect on human values by the choices we make.
  (b) values established in nature guide our choices and indicate what our duties are, but they do not force us to act in accord with those values.
  (c) freedom requires that we respond with scornful and grudging acceptance of the values implicit in the structure and laws of nature.
  (d) nature itself has meaning for humans only insofar as we choose to consider it as valuable, so our choices are not determined by nature.

122.  Bentham’s utilitarianism is different from J. S. Mill’s version in virtue of Mill’s emphasis on:
  (a) the happiness of all creatures affected by actions, versus the happiness experienced by humans.
  (b) how actions done to achieve happiness are in fact desired as opposed to being desirable.
  (c) the concern for the qualitative character of happiness versus simply the quantitative.
  (d) the number of people affected versus the intensity of pleasure experienced by those affected.

123.  Though J. S. Mill agrees with Bentham that happiness is the goal of ethical behavior, he points out that “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.”  By this remark he indicates how:
  (a) some kinds of happiness are more desirable or valuable than others for social or cultural reasons.
  (b) according to the utilitarian principle, the greatest happiness is determined by the greatest number.
  (c) happinessought to be desired (and thus is desirable) because people, in fact, desire to be happy.
  (d) uncultivated people are as competent to judge what happiness is as are cultivated people.

124.  According to J. S. Mill, “Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, that is the more desirable pleasure.”  The decision about which pleasures are qualitatively desirable should thus be made by those familiar with different kinds of pleasures based on:
  (a) whether the pleasures are egoistic (benefitting only the individual) or altruistic (benefitting others).
  (b) each person’s doing his or her moral duty.
  (c) what those persons generally desire.
  (d) whether doing that which produces happiness is also doing that which produces pleasure.

125.  In deciding how far we have to calculate the consequences of our actions, Mill says that the utilitarian recommends that we should realistically consider only:
  (a) the rules of desire determined by the person of practical wisdom.
  (b) those persons most likely to be affected by our actions.
  (c) how our behavior follows necessarily from human nature itself.
  (d) the motive of the agent, and not necessarily the consequences of our actions.

126.  Which of the following IS NOT a typical argument raised against utilitarian ethical theories?
   (a) Utilitarianism permits treating individuals unjustly if more happiness is produced by doing so.
   (b) It is difficult (if not impossible) to compare and calculate the happiness produced by alternative acts.
   (c) Utilitarians are unaware of the distinction between actual, foreseeable, and intended consequences.
   (d) For utilitarians, expediency is the fundamental moral principle: the ends justify the means.

127.  Which of the following IS NOT an objection critics raise against the utilitarian use of happiness as a criterion for making moral judgments?
  (a) Happiness cannot be used as a criterion for morality because no one makes moral judgments that way.
  (b) There is no easy way to compare different types of happiness to calculate the “greatest amount.”
  (c) Utilitarians cannot calculate happiness because future consequences of actions are never fully known.
  (d) Utilitarianism rewards doing what is expedient, even if it is unjust: the end justifies the means.

128.  One objection raised against utilitarianism is that we can never know what we are morally obliged to do since we can never know all the consequences of our actions.  Mill and other utilitarians reply to this by:
  (a) pointing out that no moral theory is ever able to indicate what we should not do.
  (b) agreeing that we may not know perfectly what the consequences will be, but we can determine them well enough to know what to do.
  (c) rejecting the claim: we, in fact, can know all of the consequences of our actions if we investigate the matter well enough.
  (d) redefining “consequences” so that they are limited to what we intend to do and not to what actually happens.

129.  Some theorists argue that the utilitarian claim that we are morally obligated to contribute to famine relief ignores one central fact about human nature, namely, that we are more inclined to help members of our own family or culture than others, and therefore should not be expected to do what we are not inclined to do in the first place.  To this the utilitarian responds:
  (a) taking care of those near us produces more overall happiness than taking care of others.
  (b) the amount of need in some cultures is greater than in others; our own needs are greatest.
  (c) while such feelings may be significant psychologically, they are irrelevant morally.
  (d) our moral obligations to promote the happiness of our family, friends, and immediate culture are more important than even obligations to protect the lives of others.

130.  One consequentialist argument against famine relief notes that feeding famine victims is not our moral responsibility, because it causes more harm than good insofar as it wastes our own resources, makes the starving more dependent on us, and creates conditions for more famine in the future.  Which of the following IS NOTa response utilitarian supporters of famine relief would typically give in return?
  (a) Feeding both the starving and ourselves would require us to become more efficient, knowledgeable, and industrious (all beneficial effects).
  (b) We have a responsibility to other human beings to save them from starvation regardless of future consequences; after all, we do not know what those consequences may be.
  (c) In feeding the starving we can–indeed, we are morally required to–demand that cultures receiving the food adopt farming and distribution programs to prevent future famine.
  (d) Recipients of food can be required to adopt social changes (e.g., birth control programs) in order to support themselves and not have to rely on others.

131.  Some critics of utilitarianism have argued that injustices against minorities would be permitted under utilitarian principles, since the violation of the rights of a few might produce more overall happiness than respecting those rights.  Utilitarians respond that, on the contrary, injustices against minorities would not be encouraged under their principles, because:
  (a) according to utilitarian principles, minorities have no rights.
  (b) if unjust practices became the rule in a society, there would be more unhappiness.
  (c) minorities do not experience happiness and unhappiness in the same way as the majority of society.
  (d) calculation of the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people does not necessarily have to include consideration of all members of a society.

132.  Act utilitarians point out that sometimes violating a moral rule causes more happiness than following the rule.  In such cases, they argue, violating the rule is permitted:
  (a) only if no other violations of the rule occur again.
  (b) as long as no one affected by the action experiences any unhappiness.
  (c) as long as the person’s intention or motive is to do his/her duty regardless of the consequences.
  (d) and even morally required by the utilitarian principle itself.

133.  Act utilitarians say that we should always do that specific action that produces the greatest happiness, even if this means violating moral rules.  Rule utilitarians challenge this, arguing that we should follow moral rules even if we think that violating them would yield better results, because:
  (a) following moral rules generally yields more overall happiness than the unhappiness created by allowing for the rare exceptions to rules.
  (b) we should not become slaves to any moral rules; morality is a matter of personal choices.
  (c) acting in general to produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people is not always the morally right thing to do.
  (d) even if we follow moral rules, we will always cause unhappiness to someone.

134.  Critics sometimes claim that, for utilitarianism, motive seems to have nothing to do with the morality of an action.  Mill responds to this by pointing out that:
  (a) good consequences cannot follow from an act done by someone with an evil motive.
  (b) bad consequences often follow from actions which are done with the best motives in mind.
  (c) consequences determine the morality of an action; the person’s motive affects only our judgment of the person doing the act, not the act itself.
  (d) the only way to determine what motive I have in acting is to determine the consequences of my action.

135.  In reply to those who object that utilitarianism permits lying if it produces happiness, J. S. Mill responds in what is now called a rule utilitarian way: “Any, even unintentional deviation from truth weakens the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is the principal support of all social well-being, civilization, virtue, and everything on which human happiness on the largest scale depends.”  Mill’s basic point is that:
  (a) insignificant (“white”) lies sometimes do cause happiness, so they are morally permissible.
  (b) even occasional white lies are immoral because they cause more harm than good in the long run.
  (c) we would be morally obligated to tell the truth even if, as a rule, it did not cause happiness.
  (d) lying is immoral because it generally causes unhappiness; but if someone who is qualified to judge the difference between happiness and unhappiness approves the lie, it is OK.

136.  Rule utilitarians have argued that injustices against minorities would be permitted under act utilitarian principles, since the violation of the rights of a few might produce more overall happiness in certain situations than respecting those rights.  They argue that, by contrast, under rule utilitarianism injustices against minorities would not be encouraged because:
  (a) individuals and minorities have rights only in deontological ethics, not in teleological ethics.
  (b) rule utilitarianism indicates how to act in general, not how to act in specific situations.
  (c) if unjust practices became the rule in a society, there would be more unhappiness.
  (d) calculation of the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people does not necessarily have to include consideration of all members of a society.

137.  Rule utilitarians argue that we should always do those things that as a rule promote happiness.  In a specific case where following the rules would probably cause unhappiness, rule utilitarians say:
  (a) people follow rules that promote their own happiness more than rules promoting general happiness.
  (b) we should abide by rules because it is our duty, not because of the consequences of following rules.
  (c) the long-term effect of violating moral rules would be more unhappiness, so we should follow the rule.
  (d) we should follow rules in specific cases only if happiness results; otherwise we should violate rules.

138.  Rule utilitarians argue that we should always do those things that, as a rule, promote happiness.  In specific cases where following the rules would be unjust and cause unhappiness, rule utilitarians point out that:
  (a) any act of injustice will cause someone unhappiness, and therefore violations of rules are still immoral.
  (b) actual consequences of our actions are often unforeseen, so we have to rely on the intended consequences.
  (c) exceptions can be built into the rules to allow for occasional short-term injustice and long-term happiness.
  (d) the only people who can make a judgment about what is just/unjust are those who know which actions promote, as a rule, happiness.

139.  The deontological theory of ethics called divine law theory is sometimes confused with natural law theory because both often refer to God.  But unlike in natural law theory, a person is, in fact, morally obligated to act in a certain way under divine law theory:
  (a) if he/she believes that it is what God commands.
  (b) if God should require him/her to act in certain ways.
  (c) if acting in accord with the person’s nature is morally correct.
  (d) if God really does command it, regardless of whether it conflicts with human nature.

140.  Divine command theorists point out that every ethical theory must have two components: a theory of value and a theory of obligation.  In the case of divine command theory, value is determined by:
  (a) what God wills, and obligation is determined by God’s rewards and punishment.
  (b) God’s will that we be happy, and obligation is determined by our acceptance of God’s will.
  (c) our interpretation of God’s will, and obligation is determined by social agreement with our interpretation.
  (d) what we believe God wills for us, and obligation is determined by what we know God wills for us.

141.  Critics of the divine-command theory of ethics raise a number of objections against it.  Which of the following IS NOT one of those objections?
  (a) If God’s command is the basis for determining what is moral, then it makes no sense to say that God’s commands are good; that is, God’s commands are arbitrary.
  (b) Because secular (non-religious) moral systems do not provide a motive or reason for acting morally, they are able to identify what is moral in a way that the divine command theory does not.
  (c) Religion is not only unnecessary for morality but is even a hindrance, because it creates false hopes and distracts people from doing good things for one another for its own sake.
  (d) Acting in a certain way simply because it is required by God does not encourage people to see why they should do what they do, and in this sense religious ethics is not as deep-seated as secular ethics.

142.  Which of the following IS NOT an objection Kant raises against consequentialism?
  (a) If we are inclined to do an act because we naturally seek good consequences (happiness), then we do not act freely and are not morally responsible.
  (b) The task of ethics is to make judgments about what people intend to do when they act, regardless of the consequences.
  (c) Because people disagree about what happiness is, good consequences cannot provide an ultimate criterion for making moral judgments.
  (d) The consequences of our actions are often out of our control, so we cannot be held responsible for them or have our actions judged based on them.

143.  Kant claims that moral obligation cannot be based on a “hypothetical imperative” such as “if you want to be happy, then you must do X,” because:
  (a) a moral imperative or command must be directed to a specific individual and require a specific action.
  (b) what people want to do is never really connected with what they actually do.
  (c) happiness can vary from person to person, is often out of our reach, and is not a freely-desired goal.
  (d) a good will acts  for the sake of doing one’s duty (which is always to produce happiness however it is defined).

144.  According to Kant, virtuous actions are those that are done for the sake of doing one’s duty–which means acting for the right reason or with the right motive or intention.  Kant limits the discussion of the moral character of actions to motives or intentions and does not consider consequences crucial, because:
  (a) the consequences are often out of our control and are valued differently by different people.
  (b) only those actions based on universalizable motives are moral actions.
  (c) moral decisions are conditioned by one’s culture and by how one is raised.
  (d) every time someone acts, he or she has a motive; but there are not always consequences to acts.

145.  According to Kant, morality presumes that I, as a rational being, am able to do what is morally right because it is morally right.  So, unless doing my duty is my motive in acting, my action is not morally good, because:
  (a) actions that are done solely for the sake of doing my duty do not promote happiness as much as actions done because they are morally right.
  (b) acting with motives other than doing my duty–for example, acting out of instinct, passion, or interest–is not universalizable and thus cannot be the basis for rational behavior.
  (c) if my motive in acting is that I am willing to take responsibility for the consequences of my action, then my action is morally good.
  (d) sometimes doing my duty conflicts with doing the right thing–especially when doing the right thing involves acting in accord with my religious beliefs.

146.  According to Kant, an action which has a motive or intention that cannot be successfully universalized:
  (a) might be moral or immoral, depending on the consequences of the action.
  (b) might be moral or immoral, depending on whether the act is considered acceptable in the person’s society.
  (c) is immoral.
  (d) might be moral or immoral, depending on whether the action is done freely.

147.  Kant claims that I can determine whether all other rational beings are obligated to do what I am obligated to do by trying to see whether:
  (a) certain practices are universally accepted throughout different cultures.
  (b) other examples of my action yield good consequences.
  (c) the action would be universally good for all individuals.
  (d) the motive of my action can be universalized without contradiction or without being unacceptable to some people.

148.  For Kant, the morality of an action is determined by the one thing over which we have control, namely, motive.  Specific actions cannot be universalized, and consequences of actions cannot determine morality because they are often out of our control.  Only motive can be the basis for moral judgments, and the only pure moral motive is:
   (a) doing that which we think is going to produce the greatest amount of happiness for the most people.
   (b) acting in a way that is consistent with our religious beliefs and conscience.
   (c) choosing to have as our motive that which other people often have as their motive in acting.
   (d) willing to do that which all other rational beings could accept and will without contradiction.

149.  According to Kant, acting morally means acting on an intention that a reasonable person could will all persons to adopt as the motive for their actions.  Critics claim that this makes Kant a consequentialist, insofar as universalizability considers the consequences of everyone acting that way.  Kant rejects this by pointing out that:
  (a) to say that an intention must be universalizable does not mean that everyone’s intentions need to be considered, only the intentions of those who are going to be affected by the action.
  (b) theintended consequences of actions are often not the same as their actual consequences.
  (c) intentions, not consequences, identify moral actions; if an intention cannot be universalized for any reason (including unacceptable consequences), it cannot be the basis for a moral act.
  (d) if people actually did their moral duty, then the consequences of their doing so would be better than if they only intended to do their duty.

150.  Kant suggests that the maxim upon which an action is based, and not the individual action itself, is the key for determining whether an action is morally good, because:
  (a) a specific action is, by definition, not universalizable.
  (b) our actions are always based on some maxim or other.
  (c) without maxims we would not know what to do.
  (d) our maxims are subjective rules of behavior upon which actions are based.

151.  Kant argues that acting in accordance with duty does not make an action morally worthwhile; rather it is acting for the sake of or because it is one’s duty that makes the act morally worthy.  He makes this distinction to indicate how:
  (a) the consequences of one’s actions might be good or bad depending on how much happiness is produced.
  (b) actions that are done freely are always morally good actions.
  (c) the moral value of an action is determined by one’s motives, not by the consequences of one’s actions.
  (d) acting in a self-interested way differs from acting based on maxims.

152.  Which of the following IS NOT an objection raised against Kant’s ethical theory?
  (a) Just because someone is concerned with promoting happiness instead of doing his/her duty, that does not mean that his/her action lacks moral value.
  (b) Just because I am naturally inclined to pursue happiness, that does not mean that I can’t act from duty.
  (c) Just because the exact consequences of actions are unknown or are not in our complete control, that does not mean that we are not responsible for or should not consider those consequences.
  (d) In moral dilemmas, rules often conflict; in such cases, Kantian ethics is of no help.

153.  According to existentialist ethics, there is no absolute foundation upon which moral judgments are based; we are free to adopt any moral system we choose.  As Sartre notes, however, we are responsible for choosing that set of values.  Any system of moral values that is established by some means other than human choice, then:
  (a) contradicts the principle on which the ability to make moral distinctions is based.
  (b) ought to be grounded in the will of God or in generally accepted social practices.
  (c) in fact never are used by people (even mistakenly) to make moral judgments.
  (d) is immoral if the consequences are bad for us.

154.  When Sartre says that “there is no human nature,” what he means is that:
  (a) as self-conscious beings, we can and do determine the kinds of beings that we are.
  (b) there can be no basis for deciding between anguish and despair.
  (c) human beings do not have genetic characteristics that identify them biologically as members of a species.
  (d) existentialism can accept the existence of God only as the a priori foundation of ethical judgments.

155.  Sartre claims that, for human beings, “existence precedes essence”; in other words:
  (a) when human beings are rational, they fulfill their essence of being human.
  (b) human beings are essentially determined to exist according to certain God-given directives.
  (c) human beings are free to choose even not to act in any way whatsoever.
  (d) human beings are condemned to be free and to become anything they choose through their actions.

156.  If, as Sartre’s existentialism claims, “man is responsible for his passion,” then no matter what we as human beings do, we do it:
  (a) against our wills.
  (b) without thought.
  (c) freely.
  (d) out of scorn for God.

157.  Nietzsche argues that the task of true morality is to indicate how human beings, as part of nature, can move “beyond good and evil” by means of the attempt to:
  (a) overcome and gradually do away with our natural inclinations of aggression and struggle.
  (b) show our nobility through self-restraint and compassion for the less fortunate.
  (c) accept tolerantly our own weaknesses as indications of our place within God’s plan.
  (d) make moral distinctions the explicit products of the exercise of human will.

158.  According to Nietzsche, members of the herd endorse the slave values of sympathy, kindness, and the “common” good because:
  (a) they feel that they should be treated kindly and compassionately since they are not responsible for their lack of power.
  (b) they believe that, if they treat the master-morality overmen kindly, those noble individuals will not harm them.
  (c) they fear that a lack of sympathy or kindness, or failure to consider the common good, will cause the men of nobility to feel threatened by them.
  (d) they prefer following God’s will rather than struggling against it (like the overmen are constantly having to do).

159.  Critics of morality (e.g., Callicles or Nietzsche) argue that recommending that people act morally (that is, with self-restraint, moderation, or concern for others) is itself an attempt by “common” people to impose their will on their superiors.  They conclude, therefore, that doing something because it is moral makes no sense, since:
  (a) even common people admit that no one should act morally unless it produces happiness for him or her.
  (b) only a personality that harmonizes the competing interests of reason, emotion, and appetite is moral.
  (c) the “all too human” values of ordinary people do not provide any guidance for how people should act.
  (d) that would require us to affirm our power to decide values by restricting that power.

160.  The “first principle” of Nietzsche’s version of humanism is this: “The weak and the failures shall perish.  They ought even to be helped to perish.  What is more harmful than vice?–Practical sympathy and pity for all the failures and all the weak: Christianity.”  In Nietzsche’s trans-valuation of humanism, Christianity is:
  (a) Nietzsche’s attempt to reintroduce values into his theory of the will to power.
  (b) an afterlife project that Nietzsche endorses as promoting the overman.
  (c) the means by which noble aims filter down from masters to slaves.
  (d) that which frustrates the prospects of human advancement.

161.  Nietzsche claims that “because life is precisely Will to Power,” the attempt to bend all wills to a common good, avoiding violence and exploitation in order to achieve peace in society, is:
  (a) “the fundamental principle of society” and the necessary means for the development of all life.
  (b) the goal of the noble class.
  (c) “the Will to the denial of life,” which itself invites dissolution and decay.
  (d) the dark night of barbarism in which “all who are born after us belong to a higher history than any history hitherto.”

162.  According to Nietzsche, everything that exists or happens is an expression of the will to power—even the resentment of weak people toward creative, self-determining individuals.  What Nietzsche objects to about “slave” resentment is not its effort but rather:
  (a) its unwillingness to acknowledge itself as the active source of its values.
  (b) its ability to destroy the will to power by promoting values of passivity and weakness.
  (c) its willingness to think that the will to power is more important than the will to truth.
  (d) its inability to free itself from the external forces that determine it to say “No” to creativity.

163.  Nietzsche’s critique of “slave morality” includes an attack on the belief in the existence of God, because as long as God exists:
  (a) human beings will continue to experience guilt for their failing to live up to God’s call for them to improve themselves in accord with His law.
  (b) there will always be the possibility that God could aid the individuals of the slave or herd mentality against the noble individual (the overman).
  (c) human beings will always have someone to fall back on and blame for their failings, rather than take responsibility for their destiny.
  (d) there is always the possibility that God may bring peace to the world and thus destroy the need for the overman.

164.  Anti-foundationalists (AFs) reject both teleological and deontological ethical theorizing because they (AFs):
  (a) deny that there is any one set of values, practices, or principles that should guide our moral decisions.
  (b) deny that anyone can justifiably make a moral decision that is not always already self-interested.
  (c) agree with logical positivists: moral judgments are merely expressions of feeling or emotion.
  (d) think that teleological and deontological theories ultimately do not appeal to any moral principles.

165.  Moral virtue, for Aristotle, entails acting in accord with the dictates of reason as determined by:
  (a) an objective, shared standard of right and wrong equally applicable to all people.
  (b) a mean or point of moderation between the extremes of morally good and morally evil behavior.
  (c) the mean or point of moderation between the extremes of possible alternative ways of acting.
  (d) the denial of one’s own interests in favor of the good of one’s community.

166.  According to Aristotle, a happy life is a life of virtue, one in which the individual contributes to the good of his or her community and is respected for such contributions.  At the heart of his description of the morally good life is one’s honor in a society, because being an honorable individual means being someone who:
  (a) recognizes how his or her own well-being is intimately linked to the good of the community.
  (b) appreciates how moral values vary from culture to culture and from individual to individual.
  (c) can live a life of moderation without having be sensitive to or involved in social or civic affairs.
  (d) contemplates philosophical principles in order to understand the truths of nature.

167.  For Aristotle, “Moral states are the results of activities like the states themselves.  It is our duty, therefore, to keep a certain character in our activities, since our moral states depend on the differences in our activities.”  This “certain character” is:
  (a) activity in accordance with reason (i.e., sensitive to the social and personal dimensions of human existence).
  (b) the point at which the individual’s “golden mean” rule cancels out the society’s own definition of “moderation.”
  (c) neither excess nor deficiency, but rather the alternation of the two (where one takes over sometimes, and the other at other times).
  (d) the point of moderation in action between virtue and vice, the individual’s good as opposed to the social definition of the good.

168.  Ethical judgments are usually distinguished from judgments of personal preference, taste, or prejudice by means of showing that ethical judgments:
 (a) can be explained in terms of the particular customs or practices of a group or culture.
 (b) are intended primarily to rationalize already accepted practices in a society.
 (c) serve only as ideals and cannot be the bases upon which people live daily.
 (d) need to be supported by reasons that should be universally intelligible or acceptable.

169.  Because absolutists argue that the quality or value of something is independent of being designated or recognized as such, they treat ethical judgments:
 (a) as relative to one’s own conscience or set of values.
 (b) as true or false depending on one’s society or on how one is raised.
 (c) as inaccessible to the human mind, ultimately unknowable and practically meaningless.
 (d) as facts about the world which are true or false regardless of human judgments.

170.  Which of the following characterizations is FALSE?
 (a) It is possible for a subjectivist to be a relativist.
 (b) It is possible for a relativist to be an objectivist.
 (c) It is possible for an absolutist to be a subjectivist.
 (d) It is possible for an objectivist to be an absolutist.

171.  Critics claim that subjective relativism is practically unacceptable and theoretically contradictory.  It is practically unacceptable in that no society could survive unless its members shared the values needed to maintain the society.   Subjective relativism is theoretically contradictory insofar as it:
  (a) assumes that individuals choose their own values and are responsible for their choice of values.
  (b) claims that moral judgments express only how someone feels about an action.
  (c) assumes a universal value (viz., freedom to decide one’s values) should be respected by others.
  (d) argues that the reasons it gives for acting morally are metaethical, not normative.

172.  According to the cultural relativist Ruth Benedict, “The very eyes with which we see a problem are conditioned by the long traditional habits of our own society.”  Because of this, she concludes:
  (a) without some perspective upon which to base claims, no observer can justifiably criticize another culture.
  (b) claims about cultural differences are as judgmental as they are descriptive.
  (c) all cultural differences can be reduced to basic differences in human nature.
  (d) organizedbehavior within a particular society prevents its own members from seeing when they have problems.

173.  According to the cultural relativist, the attempt to evaluate the moral beliefs of one’s own culture is bound to fail because:
  (a) obviously some cultures have better systems of moral beliefs than others.
  (b) values are not determined by one’s culture as much as they are by the individual’s personal beliefs and prejudices.
  (c) even within a particular culture’s belief system, no actions are really ever identified as good or bad.
  (d) in order to make such an evaluation, one has to use the very values which are themselves being judged.

174.  Critics argue that if moral relativism is correct, some beliefs and practices would not make sense—specifically:
  (a) we could not hope to resolve moral disputes, all toleration and criticism of moral beliefs would be unjustified, and there could be no real moral reform or progress.
  (b) we could not individually make judgments about what we should or should not do, present arguments to support our beliefs, or for that matter even have moral beliefs.
  (c) we could not tolerate people who have beliefs different from our own, we would have to force our values on others, and any moral reform or progress would be purely private or subjective.
  (d) we could not reduce suffering or consider the welfare of non-human beings as morally significant.

175.  Which of the following IS NOT a reason typically proposed to explain why people endorse moral relativism?
  (a) It is obvious that different cultures have different beliefs; relativism is a proper response to ethnocentrism.
  (b) There is ultimately only one right way to think about morality, one fact of the matter that does not vary from person to person: namely, relativism.
  (c) Relativism is the only viable alternative to the absolutist belief that there is only one moral standard.
  (d) With the decline of religion, fewer people believe that there is an objective set of beliefs or truths about what is right and wrong.

176.  Which of the following IS NOT an objection that can be raised against ethical relativism?
  (a) If relativism is correct, then we will not be able to resolve ethical disputes by appealing to arguments.
  (b) If relativism is correct, then we as individuals cannot believe that moral behavior reduces suffering.
  (c) If relativism is correct, then neither criticism, moral progress, nor toleration are morally justifiable.
  (d) Because it is difficult to identify the “cultures” an individual belongs to, it is not helpful to say that an individual’s values are determined by his or her culture.

177.  Ethical relativists often base their position on cultural value differences.  Such a strategy is flawed because:
  (a) the subjective, personal beliefs of an individual cannot be the basis for any moral theory.
   (b) even though cultural relativism is an absolutist position, it is not an objectivist position.
  (c) the fact that moral beliefs differ among cultures does not imply that moral beliefs ought to differ.
  (d) moral rules intended to reduce suffering and promote human flourishing are adopted in all cultures.

178.  Suppose that human well-being is the correct standard for evaluating ethical theories and judgments.  Would this mean that we have to reject the cultural relativist’s claim that each culture has a right to decide its own values?
  (a) No: no culture can impose its values on any other culture, even if those values promote human well-being.
  (b) No: all cultures are different in what they value (indeed, that is what makes them different in the first place); so the destruction of cultural differences would mean the end of cultures.
  (c) Yes: but each culture would have to decide whether “promoting well-being” for its members is really what it wants.
  (d) Yes: any culture that would not satisfy basic material and social needs of all of its members would not be as good as it should be.

179.  “Even if people have similar needs, sentiments, emotions, and attitudes, there is still the question of whether these should or should not be satisfied or accepted as legitimate.”  How is such a claim intended as a criticism of personal or cultural relativism?
  (a) The fact that people agree in their moral beliefs does not make the beliefs justified or correct.
  (b) Since people in different cultures hold different beliefs, they try to satisfy their needs differently.
  (c) Even if people agree on what they believe, it is difficult (if not impossible) to get them to live according to what they believe.
  (d) Only those beliefs which have universal support should be accepted as true.

180.  According to the cultural or subjective relativist, the fact that moral values vary from culture to culture or from individual to individual implies that no absolute or objective moral standards should be applied to all people in all times or cultures.  The problem with this line of argument is that:
  (a) it ignores the fact that not all cultures and individuals respect and tolerate the rights and values of others.
  (b) it assumes that no set of moral values can be the basis for behavior unless its absolute principles are fixed and cannot be changed or modified.
  (c) it commits the naturalistic fallacy by reasoning from the fact that values differ to the claim that people are morally justified in acting on their cultural or individual beliefs.
  (d) it endorses the logical positivist claim that moral statements are neither analytic (true by definition) nor synthetic (true by empirical observation).

181.  Relativists think that if we recognize how moral values differ from individual to individual or culture to culture, we will see that there is no neutral, objective, or universal moral standard.  From this they conclude that we should tolerate the value systems of others.  But this conclusion seems to contradict their fundamental belief because it:
  (a) suggests that tolerating different viewpoints has value only for relativists, not objectivists.
  (b) assumes that all persons universally ought to value toleration, even those who do not actually do so.
  (c) fails to indicate how toleration can be a value only for consequentialists, not deontologists.
  (d) treats toleration as a value that no one ought to adopt, even though most individuals and cultures in fact do.

182.  Critics of ethical relativism often note that cultures seldom differ on certain basic values: only their belief systems differ.  In other words:
  (a) each culture determines the basic values necessary for the culture’s existence.
  (b) no culture can exist very long unless it establishes practices that distinguish it from others.
  (c) prejudices within our own society often determine our moral views.
  (d) cultures differ in how more or less universal values are implemented in practices.

183.  “My thesis about traditional ethics is this: (1) The focus and direction of traditional ethics, indeed its function, has not been individual integrity and agency (ability to make choices and act) but rather social organization and control.  (2) The values around which traditional ethics revolves are antagonistic, the values of dominance and subordination.  As a result, (3) traditional ethics undermines rather than promotes individual moral ability and agency.  And (4) these aspects of traditional ethics combine to legitimize oppression by redefining it as social organization.  Appeal to rules and principles is at the heart of this endeavor.”  In this passage:
  (a) Sarah Hoagland shows how male-dominated ethics emphasizes competing interests, sacrifice and compromise, and duty instead of caring.
  (b) Plato points out how totalitarian political systems value traditions more highly when those traditions focus on domination and oppression.
  (c) Kant portrays ethical values as products of the antagonism between those who emphasize motives and those who emphasize consequences.
  (d) Ayn Rand expresses disappointment in ethical systems that value the rights of the individual over the rights of the State.

184.  Feminists have argued that the emphasis of virtue ethics on making moral judgments on a case-by-case basis is more in keeping with the spirit of morality than (masculine) emphases on abstract principles of justice, because:
  (a) virtue requires that we make moral judgments without considering the circumstances or situations.
  (b) morality is about doing what is right, which means doing that which can be defended universally.
  (c) ethics should be about doing our duty, which (as Kant notes) varies from person to person.
  (d) a full life balances reason and the emotional particularities of caring for others and our relationships.

185.  Progress through the feminine stages of knowing described by Mary Field Belenky and others is marked, in part, by a movement from subjective experience and intuition through a stage of shared experience and empathy.  Though this latter stage includes intuition, it is considered just as objective as masculine proof strategies, since:
  (a) it relies on communication with others to determine whether one’s personal feelings are justified.
  (b) it, like masculine strategies of reasoning, begins with accepting the testimony of experts as the truth.
  (c) it, like the masculine model, acknowledges that rationality and knowledge are ultimately subjective.
  (d) it emphasizes objective logic and reasoning instead of emotion, feeling, or personal experience.

186.  Masculine and feminine models of thinking differ about the importance of an individual’s intuition.  In the masculine model, knowledge is abstract and universal: individual intuition is either merely an example of general knowledge or a threat to it.  But in the feminine model, individual intuition is necessary because knowledge is:
  (a) arrived at only after critically examining the facts and discarding irrelevant personal testimony.
  (b) inherently and unavoidably a product of insights and feelings shared by individuals with one another.
  (c) based on what an individual learns from authorities, tradition, or his or her society.
  (d) whatever an individual personally feels is correct, regardless of what others may say or feel.

187.  According to Carol Gilligan, feminine ways of thinking about moral decisions are based on an “ethics of care” rather than (male) impersonal, abstract principles.  That is, women think of ethical situations:
  (a) as opportunities to deny that there is any right or wrong way to act and to show how the very act of making ethical distinctions is itself a form of male domination.
  (b) not as questions with true or false answers, but as conflicts that need to be resolved in order to maintain stable interpersonal relationships.
  (c) as opportunities to replace so-called universal abstract principles of ethical judgment with more specific abstract principles (e.g., principles that apply only to one’s culture).
  (d) not as gender (masculine-feminine) conflicts, but as problems that can be solved by calculating the foreseen consequences for those affected by actions.

188.  According to the (feminist) ethics of care, emotional involvement and sensitivity to the differing needs of other people in different situations are necessary elements in making objective moral judgments because:
  (a) morality is based on nothing more than how each individual feels about things.
  (b) sensitivity and caring are subjective expressions of rational, objective, unemotional ways of thinking.
  (c) particular needs and situations seem to differ, but they are similar enough for general moral judgments.
  (d) without sympathetic, emotional involvement, we cannot understand exactly what action occurs or why it is done.

189.  Critics of feminist ethics point out that, while an ethics of care might sound nice, it is less useful than an ethics of justice for addressing problems generated in modern Western societies.  To this criticism, feminists reply that:
  (a) without being able to rely on traditional ethical theories (e.g., utilitarianism, Kantian duty ethics), we would not know how to make moral decisions.
  (b) social practices should focus on cultivating relations with others rather than encouraging competition and self-interested individualism.
  (c) marketplace competition and rational self-interested behavior are matters of economic and political concern and are thus not issues that are of ethical significance.
  (d) being responsible for or caring for others in our society is best accomplished by encouraging competition and self-interested individualism.
 

Answers:
 
 

1.  A
2.  B
3.  B
4.  B
5.  A
6.  A
7.  B
8.  A
9.  A
10.  B
11.  A
12.  A
13.  B
14.  A
15.  A
16.  A
17.  A
18.  A
19.  B
20.  B
21.  A

22.  B
23.  B
24.  B
25.  A
26.  A
27.  A
28.  B
29.  A
30.  A
31.  B
32.  A
33.  B
34.  B
35.  A
36.  A
37.  B
38.  A
39.  A
40.  B
41.  B
42.  B

43.  A
44.  B
45.  B
46.  B
47.  A
48.  A
49.  A
50.  B
51.  B
52.  A
53.  B
54.  A
55.  A
56.  B
57.  A
58.  B
59.  B
60.  A
61.  B
62.  A
63.  A

64.  B
65.  A
66.  A
67.  A
68.  B
69.  A
70.  A
71.  A
72.  B
73.  A
74.  B
75.  A
76.  B
77.  B
78.  A
79.  B
80.  B
81.  B
82.  B
83.  A
84.  A

85.  A
86.  A
87.  A
88.  B
89.  A
90.  B
91.  B
92.  A
93.  A
94.  B
95.  A
96.  A
97.  B
98.  B
99.  A
100.  B
101.  B
102.  A
103.  A
104.  D
105.  B

106.  B
107.  B
108.  A
109.  C
110.  B
111.  D
112.  B
113.  C
114.  B
115.  D
116.  B
117.  D
118.  C
119.  C
120.  D
121.  D
122.  C
123.  A
124.  C
125.  B
126.  C

127.  A
128.  B
129.  C
130.  B
131.  B
132.  D
133.  A
134.  C
135.  B
136.  C
137.  C
138.  C
139.  D
140.  A
141.  B
142.  B
143.  C
144.  A
145.  B
146.  C
147.  D

148.  D
149.  C
150.  A
151.  C
152.  B
153.  A
154.  A
155.  D
156.  C
157.  D
158.  A
159.  D
160.  D
161.  C
162.  A
163.  C
164.  A
165.  C
166.  A
167.  A
168.  D

169.  D
170.  C
171.  C
172.  B
173.  D
174.  A
175.  B
176.  B
177.  C
178.  C
179.  A
180.  C
181.  B
182.  D
183.  A
184.  D
185.  A
186.  B
187.  B
188.  D
189.  B

 

PHIL 251: Intro. to Philosophy (Daniel) Test Questions:
Epistemology (Theory of Knowledge)

Answers given at end.

True/False (True=A; False=B)

1. Epistemology is the study of the origin, structure, and extent of reality.

2. Empiricism is the study of the nature, extent, origin, and justification of knowledge.

3. Empiricism is not a legitimate “epistemological” approach, because it is not really concerned with the study of the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge.

4. When I say I know something, I do not always have to believe what I claim to know.

5. Even though only true propositions can be known, it is possible to believe a proposition that is false.

6. According to Plato, the eternal Forms or Ideas are the universal characteristics by which things are what they are and are known as what they are.

 7. According to Plato, our knowledge about things in the sensible world is not based on sense experience but on our a priori apprehension of the Forms.

 8. In Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, the figures that cast shadows on the back wall of the cave are supposed to be understood as the Forms in terms of which things outside of the Cave are intelligible.

 9. According to Plato, the Form of the Good is the ultimate cause or rationale for every meaningful or intelligible thing.

 10. Because rationalism does not rely on sense experience for knowledge, it is inappropriate to speak of a “rationalist epistemology.”

11. Because rationalism does not rely on sense experience, it cannot account for how we know anything.

12. For Plato, all knowledge (as opposed to opinion) is innate insofar as it is based on reasoning that cannot have been obtained through sense experience.

13. According to Plato, to understand a thing means being able to conceive the thing in terms of the concept or logos by which it is intelligible.

14. According to Descartes, we cannot say that we know things about the world based on sense experience because we can be deceived by our senses or might simply be dreaming.

15.  An a priori statement is one whose truth/falsity is known without having to appeal to experience.

16.  The point of Descartes’ appeal to an “evil genius” is to raise doubts about his knowledge of a posteriori propositions.

17.  The point of Descartes’ appeal to an “evil genius” is to raise doubts about his knowledge of a priori propositions.

18.  Descartes uses the methodic doubt to show that there is at least one thing that can be known with absolute certainty, namely, that he exists.

19. By means of his “methodic doubt,” Descartes is able to show that there is one thing we can know with absolute certainty–namely, that we cannot know anything with certainty.

20.  Dualists (like Descartes) argue that human beings are composed of immaterial bodies and material souls or minds.

21. In order for the self to exist, Descartes argues, there must be an infinite being (God) as the background that makes possible the cogito’s knowledge of itself as a finite existence.

22. In order to know that he exists, Descartes first has to prove that his bodily senses can be trusted when they reveal to him that he is behaving in a thinking manner.

23. The methodic doubt by which Descartes hopes to achieve certainty and a foundation for claims of knowledge is, for him, both a real and reasonable doubt about the existence of things.

24. Descartes’ “methodic doubt” is intended to raise doubts about illusions, dreams, and occasionally sense experiences–but not about beliefs concerning the self, God, or one’s own body.

25. According to Descartes, since sense experience is sometimes deceiving, it cannot be the ultimate and indubitable (undoubtable) basis for knowledge.

26. By means of his wax example Descartes wants to show how our ideas of substance and identity are not based on sense experience.

27. Philosophical skepticism claims that nothing exists.

28. Epistemology does not consider skepticism as a legitimate theory because skepticism claims that we can never be completely justified in our beliefs.

29. A solipsist is someone who doubts whether anything else exists other than his or her own mind.

30. According to Descartes, no all-good God would permit us ever to make mistakes about what we claim to know about the world using our senses.

31. According to Descartes, the criteria or principles for determining whether a claim is true are clarity and distinctness.

32. By assuming that knowledge is possible by reasoning alone, rationalists conclude that the only things we ever know to exist are our minds and their ideas.

33. An a priori statement is one whose truth/falsity is known without having to appeal to experience.

34. An a posteriori statement is one whose truth/falsity is known without having to appeal to experience.

35. Even though a posteriori propositions can sometimes be universal, they are never necessary (that is, they are always contingent).

36. In place of Descartes’ psychological criteria for determining truth and certainty, Leibniz substitutes logical criteria (such as whether most people believe a statement to be true).

37. Because supporters of extrasensory perception do not limit claims of knowledge to data provided by the five senses, they are considered rationalists, relying on reason alone for knowledge.

38. To say that Locke is a representational realist means that he believes that at least some of our ideas actually represent things outside of the mind.

39. In Locke’s representationalist theory of perception, external objects in the world cause us to have ideas from which we infer the existence of things.

40. According to Locke, ideas of sensation and reflection are innate because they are based on primary rather than secondary qualities.

41. By referring to the mind as a tabula rasa, Locke emphasizes the empiricist position that prior to experience the mind is blank or empty.

42.  In Locke’s causal theory of perception, external objects in the world cause us to have ideas from which we infer the existence of things.

43. According to Locke, we know about abstract general ideas like humanity or blueness because there are such general things in the world to which such ideas correspond.

44. Primary qualities, for Locke, are characteristics of things (e.g., being solid, taking up space, being in motion or at rest) which resemble the ideas we have of those characteristics.

45.  To distinguish primary and secondary qualities, Locke assumes that we can compare those characteristics of things that exist in objects themselves with characteristics that exist only in our minds.

46. According to Berkeley, because we can never know anything outside of our own minds, we must conclude that there is no such thing as a real world.

47. According to Berkeley, because we can never know anything outside of our own minds, the only defensible philosophic position is solipsism.

48. For Berkeley, “To be is to be perceived or to perceive” means that the only things that are real are ideas and the minds that have those ideas.

49. Berkeley recognizes that to his claim “to be is to be perceived” he has to add “or to perceive” in order to allow for the existence of minds (which are not perceived).

50. According to Berkeley, since only a mind can actually perceive ideas, and ideas are not real things, then only minds really exist.

51. According to Hume, because our ideas are copies of sense impressions, we cannot form ideas of anything (even imaginary creatures) without drawing ultimately on sense experiences.

52. “All human beings think clearly” is an example of a tautology.

53. For Hume causal relations are properly described by means of a posteriori statements.

54.  David Hume argues that, because things are nothing more than clusters of ideas, there is no meaningful way to talk about an external world which causes our ideas.

55. Mathematical propositions (e.g., 7+5=12) are known a priori because their truth or falsity can be known without having to appeal to sense experience.

56. According to Kant, all synthetic a priori judgments are false.

57. It is possible to believe something that is false and still do so rationally (i.e., with good reasons).

58. According to typically masculine ways of thinking, the proper way to philosophize is to defend one’s beliefs against those of others by showing how other beliefs are wrong or contradictory.

59. Because feminist philosophy competes with, confronts, and criticizes masculine forms of reasoning, it claims to be the correct way to think, not just a strategy for appreciating alternative ways of thinking.

60.  A statement is true, according to the coherence theory of truth, if it is consistent with facts in the world that are independent of our beliefs.

61. Because they differ on what it means to say that a statement is true, a coherence theorist and a pragmatist would also differ on which statements are true and which are false.

62. According to James’s pragmatism, a proposition is true if, when acted upon, it satisfies our expectations.

63. According to Francis Bacon, the task of science is to discover the hidden causes or “forms” of phenomena in order to be able to manipulate things to satisfy human needs.

64. In saying that scientific observations must conform to reason’s own laws, Kant indicates how the experiments are really guided tests and not random or indifferent observations.

65. According to Popper’s falsifiability criterion of science, theories proven to be false must not really have been scientific in the first place.

66. According to Kuhn, scientific progress is possible only because there is a growing base of theory-neutral data.

67. In Kuhn’s account, the correctness of a scientific theory is ultimately determined by whether it describes nature, regardless of whether it is accepted by the scientific community.
 

Multiple Choice

68. Which of the following IS NOT a necessary characteristic for saying that Mary knows that today is Monday?
  (a) It must be, in fact, true that today is Monday.
  (b) Mary must be able to give a reason or justification for thinking that today is Monday.
  (c) Mary could not have been tricked into thinking that today is any day other than Monday.
  (d) Mary must believe that today is Monday.

69. To say that you know that there is life on other planets necessarily implies that you believe there is life on other planets, that you have reasons to back up your belief, and that:
  (a) life on other planets is perhaps vastly different from what we are used to.
  (b) you can trust your senses when you see extraterrestrial life forms.
  (c) you have experienced life on other planets personally.
  (d) there is, in fact, life on other planets.

70. In order for me to know that birds fly, it must be true that birds do fly, because:
  (a) if it were not the case that birds fly, then I would know that which is not true; in short, I would know no thing: I     would not know.
  (b) whenever I claim to know something, I have to rely on what I have been taught.
  (c) if it is true that birds fly (as it, in fact, is), then I cannot be mislead into thinking otherwise.
  (d) unless I have seen birds fly I will not believe others when they tell me that birds do, in fact, fly.

71. According to Descartes, illusions and dreams often appear as real as ordinary sense experience, but they obviously cannot provide us with any certainty about the world.  Because sense experience is also often mistaken, it too cannot provide a dependable ground for knowledge.  Given such a situation, he concludes, the most responsible thing that a true searcher for truth can do is to engage in methodic doubt–that is, a doubt about:
 (a) those things for which we have good reason to doubt.
 (b) only those things for which we have no good reason to doubt.
 (c) contingent but not necessary truths.
 (d) everything, even if such a doubt seems unreasonable.

72. Descartes’ appeal to the device of the evil genius to make sure that we do not uncritically accept a priori propositions without first allowing for the remote possibility that we might be in error about them.  Why?
  (a) Unlike a posteriori propositions that depend for their truth or falsity on experience, a priori propositions are known as true or false prior to experience.
  (b) A priori propositions are both necessary and universal, whereas a posteriori propositions are not.
  (c) If there is the slightest possibility that we could be in error about the foundation of our knowledge, then everything based on that foundation is questionable.
  (d) The evil genius is Descartes’ way of ensuring that he does not forget how his whole project of methodic doubt is itself prior to any experiences (and thus a priori).

73. As the product of his methodic doubt, the proposition “I think, therefore I am” provides Descartes with exactly what he as a rationalist needs to develop an epistemology, namely:
 (a) a criterion or rule by which to distinguish a priori from a posteriori propositions.
 (b) an indubitable, certain principle on which to ground all other claims of knowledge.
 (c) a way of distinguishing empiricist principles from rationalist principles of knowledge.
 (d) the basis for an a posteriori proof for the existence of God.

74. Descartes argues that the cogito is the necessary foundation for all subsequent knowledge insofar it:
  (a) provides an indubitable principle on which all other claims of knowledge can be based.
  (b) is the first step in Descartes’ method of doubt.
  (c) is not really known to be true but is rather something that everyone believes.
  (d) can be doubted just as much as anything else we might claim to know.

75. According to the “epistemological turn” epitomized by Descartes’ philosophy, epistemology takes precedence over metaphysics.  In other words, in Descartes’ philosophy:
 (a) that which is real is more important than that which is imaginary.
 (b) before we can know what exists, we must know what we can know and what knowing means.
 (c) knowing something to be true comes after believing something to be true.
 (d) nothing exists without first being known by human beings to exist.

76. In order to know anything with certainty about the world or about whether he even has a body, Descartes first has to prove that God exists, because:
  (a) as the most important thing in the world, God is the first thing that must be shown to exist.
  (b) if God’s existence is doubtful, so is Descartes’ existence; so he has to prove that God exists.
  (c) if an all-good, all-powerful God exists, He would not allow us to be mistaken when we have clear and distinct ideas of the world.
  (d) without God there is no reasonable hope for an afterlife and thus no reason to act morally.

77. Descartes’ wax example indicates how we can know what a thing (e.g., wax) is:
 (a) in purely mathematical terms, without having to rely on what our senses tell us about it.
 (b) only after it has changed into something which it originally is not.
 (c) in terms about which even the evil genius could not have tricked us.
 (d) without having to relate scientific truth to religious belief.

78. Descartes’ wax example is intended to show that the wax is the same substance before and after it is melted, and this observation indicates how:
  (a) our senses portray the physical characteristics of wax in purely non-sensible ways.
  (b) our knowledge of sensible objects is based on what reason (not sense) identifies as wax.
  (c) without sense experiences, we would not know whether the wax before and after melting is the same.
  (d) knowing that something is wax is the same thing as sensibly experiencing something as wax.

79. Descartes would say that empiricists confuse the criteria of truth with the sources of knowledge when they claim that sense experience should be the means for determining whether a statement is true or false.  Descartes rejects this way of thinking because (as he notes):
  (a) any sense experience may itself be mistaken, so sensation cannot be used to judge truth.
  (b) the criteria for deciding whether a statement is true are based on sense experience.
  (c) what we know (i.e., what our knowledge is about) is given to us by reason; sense experience provides us with the justification for claiming that we know.
  (d) though sensation cannot be trusted to provide knowledge, it is all we have for knowing.

80.  Both Plato and Descartes are often identified as rationalists because they agree generally on a series of beliefs that distinguish them from empiricists.  Which of the following IS NOT a typical rationalist claim?
 (a) Sense experience cannot be trusted to provide knowledge.
 (b) There is a constant, intelligible order underlying the changes in the world we experience.
 (c) Knowledge is based ultimately on innate ideas and a priori principles.
 (d) Though sense experience is sometimes deceptive, it is necessary for true knowledge.

81. Leibniz claims that some propositions (what he calls “truths of reason”) can be known to be true or false without having to appeal to sense experience.  Knowledge about them is based on two laws or principles:
  (a) the law of divine explanation and the principle of sufficient reason.
  (b) the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of harmony.
  (c) the principle of doubt and the law of methodic doubt.
  (d) the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle.

82. Which of the following is a contingent proposition?
  (a) Something cannot exist and not-exist at the same time in the same respect.
  (b) A whole is always greater than any one of its parts.
  (c) If A = B, and B = C, then A = C.
  (d) All cultures agree fundamentally on what is true or false.

83. Which of the following is an a priori proposition?
  (a) All material objects are extended (that is, they take up space).
  (b) Some material objects are heavier than others.
  (c) All physical objects are seen sometime or other by some human being.
  (d) Some material objects are living creatures.

84. According to critics of foundationalist epistemology (like Richard Rorty), evidence for one’s beliefs can be conclusive without being necessarily conclusive or based on some indubitable (undoubtable) principle such as Descartes’ cogito.  That is, it is sometimes legitimate to say that we “know” something even when:
 (a) we don’t believe it.
 (b) what we know is not based on any evidence.
 (c) all evidence contradicts our belief.
 (d) we might still be wrong.

85. Empiricists charge that if claims of knowledge are limited to things we know with logical certainty, we will never be able to know anything about existing things in the world, because:
 (a) the actual existence of things in the world is known only through experience, not reason.
 (b) simply by thinking or reasoning we can know specifically which things exist and how.
 (c) things in the world cannot be known to exist unless they exist previously in some mind.
 (d) the existence of things depends on their having been created by some prior cause, God.

86. According to empiricists, though the kind of information provided by analytic a priori propositions is indubitable, it is not very useful in expanding our knowledge about the world, because:
  (a) the world is nothing other than what we experience it to be.
  (b) such propositions are concerned with the world as it is in itself, not with how we experience the world.
  (c) any information provided by such propositions is ultimately based on someone’s personal experience.
  (d) such propositions are true (or false) by definition and do not describe any facts about the world.

87. Rationalists (like Descartes) and empiricists (like Locke and Berkeley) differ on what they see as the primary topic with which epistemology should be concerned, in that rationalists:
  (a) doubt that there is anything that can be known with certainty; whereas empiricists doubt we can ever make mistakes when we appeal to the senses.
  (b) emphasize the origin and extent of knowledge, and empiricists emphasize its nature and justification.
  (c) emphasize the nature and justification of knowledge; empiricists emphasize its origin and extent.
  (d) say that reasoning is based on sense experience; empiricists say that sense experience is based on reasoning.

88. In his assault on innate ideas, Locke notes that some thinkers argue that maybe all people (including children) have such innate ideas but simply are not aware of knowing such truths.  To this particular point Locke responds:
 (a) it makes no sense to say that we know something that we do not know.
 (b) even children know what they know only by means of experience.
 (c) even if all people agreed about a belief, that would not necessarily make it innate.
 (d) because we should limit our assent to the evidence, we should believe in innate ideas only to the extent that we have evidence for them.

89. In calling the mind a “tabula rasa,” Locke wants to emphasize that all knowledge, even knowledge of mathematical truths, is based on solely on:
 (a) innate ideas.                                 (b) experience.
 (c) formal training or education.          (d) language.

90. “The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them, whether anyone’s senses perceive them or not; and therefore they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies.  But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna [bread].”  In this passage Locke locates the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in the difference between:
  (a) the parts of bodies that we cannot sense and the parts that we can sense.
  (b) qualities of bodies that exist independently of sensation and qualities that rely on sensation.
  (c) the power to perceive things in our own bodies and the power to perceive things in other bodies.
  (d) those qualities that no one ever perceives and those qualities that we always perceive.

91. Substance, Locke claims, is that “I know not what” in which the primary qualities of a thing inhere.  Without assuming the existence of substance and primary qualities, Locke would not be able to conclude that his knowledge is in any way:
 (a) the same as the knowledge that God has in coordinating events in the universe.
 (b) the same as the knowledge that God has in ordering our sense data into specific things.
 (c) the same as other people have when they have his experiences.
 (d) based or grounded in a reality apart from experience.

92. In his critique of Locke, Berkeley notes that primary qualities cannot legitimately be distinguished from secondary qualities, because:
  (a) primary qualities exist in the mind of God, whereas secondary qualities exist only in human minds.
  (b) neither primary nor secondary qualities can be known except insofar as they exist outside of or beyond all minds (finite or infinite).
  (c) primary qualities depend as much on the mind’s perspective as do secondary qualities.
  (d) the primary qualities of things (such as solidity, extension, motion/rest) are different from secondary qualities (such as colors, scents, sounds).

93. Berkeley suggests that his theory prevents the skeptic from denying the existence of God, because in Berkeley’s philosophy the existence of God is necessary to show why:
  (a) we feel that something external to us causes us to have particular perceptions.
  (b) theskeptical attitude towards knowledge undermines the doctrine of secondary qualities but not that of primary qualities.
  (c) the laws of nature are human generalizations of our experiences.
  (d) our interest in perception is one which has a religious or theological character.

94. According to Berkeley, even if you and I do not have the same mental experiences when we think “red,” we are still able to agree on what red is because:
 (a) as a secondary quality, the color red is something that is purely private and individual.
 (b) we learn to associate our experiences with words that we agree upon intersubjectively.
 (c) we in fact do have the same mental experience, even if we don’t know it.
 (d) red is a simple idea, whereas redness is an abstract idea.

95. Instead of saying that we often perceive what really exists, Berkeley argues that:
  (a) what really exists is what we or some other minds perceive.
  (b) that which really perceives is all that really exists.
  (c) that which is perceived is that which does the perceiving.
  (d) we seldom perceive what really exists; when we do, we do not recognize it as such.

96. Berkeley expands his definition of the meaning of real things to include perceivers as well as things perceived because:
 (a) we can perceive our own minds but not the minds of others.
 (b) God perceives those things which no other minds perceive.
 (c) we can perceive each others’ minds but not our own.
 (d) nothing can be perceived without its being perceived by some mind(s).

97. Plato’s objective idealism differs from Berkeley’s subjective idealism in that:
  (a) for Plato, ideas or Forms are real; for Berkeley, ideas are mere fictions and therefore unreal.
  (b) for Plato, ideas or Forms exist outside of minds; for Berkeley, ideas exist only in minds.
  (c) for Plato, ideas or Forms are immaterial entities; for Berkeley, ideas are material entities.
  (d) for Plato, ideas or Forms are conceptual generalizations; for Berkeley, ideas are spiritual or immaterial copies of spiritual realities.

98. If all I ever know is that I exist and have ideas, but cannot be sure about whether those ideas refer to anything outside of myself, then I am trapped in my own consciousness.  Such a position is referred to as:
  (a) conceptualism.   (b) phenomenalism.
  (c) solipsism.           (d) representational realism.

99. “There is no question of importance whose decision is not comprised in the science of man; and there is none which can be decided with any certainty before we become acquainted with that science.”  Here Hume notes that since everything is known through our ideas and reasoning, then:
  (a) an empiricist epistemology is better than a rationalist epistemology insofar as empiricism gives us knowledge of the world and rationalism gives us knowledge of ourselves.
  (b) by acknowledging that certainty is unachievable, we show the fruitlessness of trying to develop a philosophy of human nature.
  (c) to know anything about human nature with any certainty, we first have to know about the world apart from our ideas and processes of reasoning.
  (d) by understanding human nature (which includes how our ideas of things are ordered), we can understand everything that is knowable.

100. Hume points out that, if all our ideas are based on experience, then our idea that every event has a cause would likewise have to be based on experience of every event.  But we have not had experiences of future events, nor have we had experiences even of every past event.  So how can we be sure that all (even future) events have causes?  Hume’s answer:
  (a) since past events are going to be like future events, we can be sure they will all have causes.
  (b) we can’t be sure: all we do is “imagine” events will have causes, we develop that habit.
  (c) there is no such thing as a future event or (for that matter) a past event, only present events.
  (d) it is impossible even to imagine an event without imagining it as having had a cause.

101. According to Hume, I cannot know (or predict with any certainty or high probability) that things in the future will occur in particular ways, because:
  (a) I know that the future will not resemble the past: that is what distinguishes the future from the past.
  (b) to have an idea of the future, I would have to have an idea of my future self (which is impossible).
  (c) knowledge of the future would require an infinite intellect; for Hume, only God knows the future.
  (d) I have no experience on which to base the claim that the future will resemble the past.

102. Hume’s analysis of cause and effect undermines any claim to know that our ideas are caused by things in the world, because (according to Hume):
  (a) even though we cannot know that our ideas are caused by things in the world, we can at least believe that things in the world cause our ideas.
  (b) the very notion of cause is unintelligible because it is not based on any sense experience.
  (c) we have no experience of any necessary connection between ideas and the things outside of our ideas that supposedly cause them.
  (d) even if I can know exactly what it is that I am experiencing at a particular moment, that does not mean that what I am experiencing actually exists in the world as the cause of that experience or idea.

103. According to Kant, the way to respond to Hume’s critique of causality is to show that certainty about propositions like “every event has a cause” is possible in virtue of the fact that:
  (a) our experience of events itself is caused by something apart from all experience.
  (b) the “law” of causality (every event has a cause) is merely an inductive generalization.
  (c) even though every “effect” has a cause, not every “event” has a cause.
  (d) the mind (reason) structures all (even future) experiences in determinate, unchanging ways.

104. In order to avoid Hume’s conclusion that we cannot know that things in the future will always have causes, Kant argues that we know that all events in the future will have causes because:
  (a) our belief that future events will have causes is so strong that it alone is sufficient to guarantee that future events will, in fact, have causes.
  (b) all minds are organized in such a way that, in order for events (including future events) to be experienced at all, they must always be experienced as having a cause.
  (c) cause-and-effect is a law of nature independent of human experience; regardless of whether we or any other minds experience them, events in the future will have causes.
  (d) future events themselves are caused by past and present events; so we know that if future events occur at all, they will have been caused by something.

105. According to Logical Positivists, only those statements that can be tested by experience or are true by definition are meaningful.  The most that one would be able to say about ethical or religious claims would be:
 (a) they report on how we feel about something, but they do not express any truth.
 (b) such claims may be true or false; it’s just that we may not know whether our beliefs are justified.
 (c) they are purely logical truths–that is, truths of reason (or by definition), not matters of fact.
 (d) they have meaning insofar as they provide the hypothetical or theoretical bases for thought.

106. According to phenomenalism, the meaning of a sentence consists in its being either a tautology or understandable in terms of past or predicted sense experiences.  In other words, a sentence (like “God exists”) is meaningful only if:
 (a) for the person who utters it, the sentence has meaning, regardless of what others think.
 (b) it represents the truth, even if we don’t know which experiences to believe.
 (c) it is true by definition or is testable by appeal to sense experience.
 (d) it expresses a belief that is innate, known to all rational beings.

107. Phenomenalists claim that physical things are simply constructs of sense data that we talk about in ways different from those things that we identify as mental or spiritual things.  Specifically, to say that a thing is a physical object means that:
 (a) it is proper to speak about the thing in terms of dimensionality, size, and shape.
 (b) the thing’s primary qualities (extension, shape, and solidity) do not depend on the mind.
 (c) appearances of the thing, even in hallucinations or dreams, must be accepted as real.
 (d) claims about it are ultimately understandable as being tautologies.

108. According to the psychological atomism implicit in phenomenalism, our knowledge of the world is built up from discrete sensory impressions.  However, as gestalt theorists point out, perceptions are not intelligible simply as isolated data but rather depend for their intelligibility on:
 (a) other equally isolated sense data that are themselves intelligible as innate ideas.
 (b) whether ideas are caused by substances in the world or by God directly.
 (c) logical constructs of neutral (neither mental nor physical) sense experiences.
 (d) the linguistic background or social field of expectations by which they are identified.

109. Rorty’s critique of phenomenalism is based on his rejection of the presupposition that knowledge requires a foundation in either innate ideas or sense data.  Instead of thinking of knowledge as a relation between a belief and a fact about the world, we should think of knowledge (he claims) as a relation between:
  (a) what we think we know and what we actually do know.
  (b) a belief and the social, historical arguments given to support it.
  (c) our sense perceptions and our innate ideas.
  (d) the way the mind organizes experiences according to the surface grammar of language and the way that language itself is structured by the deep grammar of neurology.

110.  In the correspondence theory of truth, the proposition “There is a desk in this room” is true only if:
 (a) I think there is a desk in this room.
 (b) it is reasonable to think that there is a desk in this room.
 (c) there is a desk in this room.
 (d) if I try to sit on what I think is the desk, it will support me.

111. Some critics argue that, because the correspondence theory of truth assumes that facts are simply “out there” and uninterpreted, the correspondence theory makes it impossible to know whether a proposition is ever true or false, because:
  (a) regardless of what we may believe, there is something external to us serves as the criterion for whether our beliefs are true or false.
  (b) even though we cannot know uninterpreted facts, we must believe that they exist, because they are the means by which we generate interpreted facts.
  (c) as long as what we know about the world is limited to our beliefs, then we cannot compare those beliefs to some standard outside of us.
  (d) no proposition about the world can both be true and false without violating rules of logic that hold not only for what we believe but also for the structure of the world.

112. Critics charge that the coherence theory of truth is unable to explain falsehood, because if truth is defined as the coherence of a proposition or belief with other propositions or beliefs, then are not all coherent systems of belief true?  That is, if a belief is true because it is consistent with other beliefs in a system, then:
  (a) how do we tell whether a proposition is inconsistent with other beliefs in that same system?
  (b) can’t a belief be false and yet the whole system with which it is consistent still be true?
  (c) why can’t judgments that are consistent with many other beliefs still be false within the same system of beliefs?
  (d) couldn’t the whole set of consistent beliefs be false?

113. Kierkegaard notes that the truth about the “objective uncertainties” of human existence is not knowable in the same way  as other facts about the world, because those “facts” do not concern things about which we really care.  What makes a belief true, though, is not only that we care about it but also that:
  (a) they are based on an objective, impersonal relation between the belief and the world.
  (b) even after adopting the belief we acknowledge that we still might be in error.
  (c) after adopting the belief we no longer worry that we could be in error.
  (d) faith in God allows us to believe anything we want and that will make it true.

114. Feminist epistemology denies that so-called objective “facts” (e.g., about atoms, genetic characteristics of illnesses, or even logical ways of reasoning ) are independent of personal and socio-political interests, because:
  (a) the only “facts” about the world and ourselves that are really objective are those that are discovered and confirmed by legitimate authorities and experts.
  (b) it is impossible for anyone to identify anything as a “fact” without first knowing which personal or socio-political interests are affecting his or her observations and reasoning.
  (c) by investigating things in certain ways, we use intuitions, emotions, and shared expectations to focus our attention, guide our thoughts, and influence our observations about “facts.”
  (d) unlike “facts” relating to the physical world (e.g., atoms, illness), matters that concern psychological, social, and political relations are not really facts at all.

115. Masculine and feminine models of thinking differ about the importance of an individual’s intuition.  In the masculine model, knowledge is abstract and universal: individual intuition is either merely an example of general knowledge or a threat to it.  But in the feminine model, individual intuition is necessary because knowledge is:
  (a) arrived at only after critically examining the facts and discarding irrelevant personal testimony.
  (b) inherently and unavoidably a product of insights and feelings shared by individuals with one another.
  (c) based on what an individual learns from authorities, tradition, or his or her society.
  (d) whatever an individual personally feels is correct, regardless of what others may say or feel.

116. Progress through the feminine stages of knowing described by Mary Field Belenky and others is marked, in part, by a movement from subjective experience and intuition through a stage of shared experience and empathy.  Though this latter stage includes intuition, it is considered just as objective as masculine proof strategies, since:
  (a) it relies on communication with others to determine whether one’s personal feelings are justified.
  (b) it, like masculine strategies of reasoning, begins with accepting the testimony of experts as the truth.
  (c) it, like the masculine model, acknowledges that rationality and knowledge are ultimately subjective.
  (d) it emphasizes objective logic and reasoning instead of emotion, feeling, or personal experience.

117. Though they claim to be arguing rationally, supporters and opponents of creation science disagree about the limits of what science properly can say about the origin of the universe and life.  That difference can be summarized this way:
  (a) creation scientists explain the origin of the universe and life by explicit reference to the Bible, whereas their opponents claim that science rejects the teachings of the Bible.
  (b) in contrast to scientists, creationists do not really propose their position as a scientific theory but only as a religious attitude that one can adopt to complement scientific beliefs.
  (c) creation scientists argue that since science is limited to experiments and testing, no theory about creation can be properly called scientific.
  (d) creationists consider the creation of the universe and life as supernatural events that explain the natural world; opponents limit science to claims about natural events.
 

Short Essay: How do rationalism and empiricism–and epistemology in general–accept the Socratic claim that the intelligibility of anything requires that it be based on an ultimate foundation (or logos)?

Rationalism and empiricism assume that, without a basis for thinking (either in the ways we reason or in sense experience), we could not justify claims of knowledge–since justification must involve appeal to some foundation rather than simply a web of beliefs.
 

Answers:
 
 

1.  B
2.  B
3.  B
4.  B
5.  A
6.  A
7.  A
8.  B
9.  A
10.  B
11.  B
12.  A
13.  A
14.  A
15.  A
16.  B
17.  A

18.  A
19.  B
20.  B
21.  A
22.  B
23.  B
24.  B
25.  A
26.  A
27.  B
28.  B
29.  A
30.  B
31.  A
32.  A
33.  A
34.  B

35.  A
36.  B
37.  B
38.  A
39.  A
40.  B
41.  A
42.  A
43.  B
44.  A
45.  A
46.  B
47.  B
48.  A
49.  A
50.  B
51.  A

52.  B
53.  A
54.  A
55.  A
56.  B
57.  A
58.  A
59.  B
60.  B
61.  B
62.  A
63.  A
64.  A
65.  B
66.  B
67.  B
68.  C

69.  D
70.  A
71.  D
72.  C
73.  B
74.  A
75.  B
76.  C
77.  A
78.  B
79.  A
80.  D
81.  D
82.  D
83.  A
84.  D
85.  A
 

86.  D
87.  C
88.  A
89.  B
90.  B
91.  D
92.  C
93.  A
94.  B
95.  A
96.  D
97.  B
98.  C
99.  D
100.  B
101.  D
102.  C
 

103.  D
104.  B
105.  A
106.  C
107.  A
108.  D
109.  B
110.  C
111.  C
112.  D
113.  B
114.  C
115.  B
116.  A
117.  D

 

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